scholarly journals Parasite infection impairs the shoaling behaviour of uninfected shoal members under predator attack

2021 ◽  
Vol 75 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolle Demandt ◽  
David Bierbach ◽  
Ralf H. J. M. Kurvers ◽  
Jens Krause ◽  
Joachim Kurtz ◽  
...  

Abstract A key benefit of sociality is a reduction in predation risk. Cohesive group behaviour and rapid collective decision making are essential for reducing predation risk in groups. Parasite infection might reduce an individuals’ grouping behaviours and thereby change the behaviour of the group as a whole. To investigate the relationship between parasite infection and grouping behaviours, we studied groups of three-spined sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, varying the number of individuals experimentally infected with the cestode Schistocephalus solidus. We studied groups of six sticklebacks containing 0, 2, 3, 4 or 6 infected individuals before and after a simulated bird attack. We predicted that infected individuals would have reduced shoaling and swimming speed and that the presence of infected individuals within a group would reduce group cohesion and speed. Uninfected fish increased shoaling and reduced swimming speed more than infected fish after the bird attack. In groups containing both infected and uninfected fish, the group behaviours were dominated by the more frequent character (uninfected versus infected). Interestingly, groups with equal numbers of uninfected and infected fish showed the least shoaling and had the lowest swimming speeds, suggesting that these groups failed to generate a majority and therefore displayed signs of indecisiveness by reducing their swimming speed the most. Our results provide evidence for a negative effect of infection on a group’s shoaling behaviour, thereby potentially deteriorating collective decision making. The presence of infected individuals might thus have far-reaching consequences in natural populations under predation risk. Significance statement Parasite-infected individuals often show deviating group behaviours. This might reduce the anti-predator benefits of group living. However, it is unknown whether such deviations in group behaviour might influence the shoaling behaviour of uninfected group members and thereby the behaviour of the group as a whole. By experimentally infecting sticklebacks and investigating groups varying in infection rates, we show that infected sticklebacks differ in their shoaling behaviours from uninfected sticklebacks. Additionally, the presence of infected sticklebacks within the group affected the behaviour of uninfected shoal members. We show that shoals of infected fish are less cohesive and move slower compared to shoals of uninfected fish. Furthermore, we show that the infection rate of the shoal is crucial for how the group behaves.

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "


Author(s):  
Claire Taylor

The chapter examines a major corruption scandal that involved the Athenian orator Demosthenes and an official of Alexander the Great. This episode reveals how tensions between individual and collective decision-making practices shaped Athenian understandings of corruption and anticorruption. The various and multiple anticorruption measures of Athens sought to bring ‘hidden’ knowledge into the open and thereby remove information from the realm of individual judgment, placing it instead into the realm of collective judgment. The Athenian experience therefore suggests that participatory democracy, and a civic culture that fosters political equality rather than reliance on individual expertise, provides a key bulwark against corruption.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN FAUDE ◽  
JULIA FUSS

AbstractInstitutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap. First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem. Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institutional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims.


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