Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 227-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Collective Memory ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
Memory Group ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

scholarly journals Extended self

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Extended Self ◽  
Demarcation Line ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

In this paper I aim to show that in the debate about the nature of the self one concept, the concept of the cognitive self, has a theoretical primacy over other conceptual alternatives because of its connection with the concept of a person in the debate about personal identity. Consequently, I will offer a defence of the hypothesis that the Extended Mind thesis implies the Extended Cognitive Self thesis if we additionally assume Parfit?s Psychological criterium of personal identity. After I consider several counterarguments to the claim that the Extended Mind implies the Extended Self, I will offer their criticism and show that they either distort the original Extended Mind thesis or introduce hardly defensible metaphysical assumptions. To one such assumption, that claims that one mind can contain another, I will pay special attention. By careful examination it will be shown that such assumption can be kept only if the relation between the mereologically connected minds is such that prevents psychological continuity between them, while it has to be abandoned if there is a psychological continuity between such minds because it would produce numerous problems such as the problem of too many thinkers, the proliferation of minds, the concept of the person would become useless, etc. Also, these considerations will lead us to the clear demarcation line between those approaches that claim the possibility of group minds and those that claim that there are extended minds. Their key difference will be in taking contrary stances towards the relation of psychological continuity when it comes to different wide minds and their biological constituents. This will be one of the main results of this paper, together with the defence of the Extended Cognitive Self thesis.

Can Consciousness Extend?

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-264
Author(s):  
Karina Vold ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Popular Belief ◽  
Nervous Systems ◽  
Robust Version ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Different Shapes ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Cognitive Niches ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis prompted philosophers to think about the different shapes our minds can take as they reach beyond our brains and stretch into new technologies. Some of us rely heavily on the environment to scaffold our cognition, reorganizing our homes into rich cognitive niches, for example, or using our smartphones as swiss-army knives for cognition. But the thesis also prompts us to think about other varieties of minds and the unique forms they take. What are we to make of the exotic distributed nervous systems we see in octopuses, for example, or the complex collectives of bees? In this paper, I will argue for a robust version of the extended mind thesis that includes the possibility of extended consciousness. This thesis will open up new ways of understanding the different forms that conscious minds can take, whether human or nonhuman. The thesis will also challenge the popular belief that consciousness exists exclusively in the brain. Furthermore, despite the attention that the extended mind thesis has received, there has been relatively less written about the possibility of extended consciousness. A number of prominent defenders of the extended mind thesis have even called the idea of extended consciousness implausible. I will argue, however, that extended consciousness is a viable theory and it follows from the same ‘parity argument’ that Clark and Chalmers (1998) first advanced to support the extended mind thesis. What is more, it may even provide us with a valuable paradigm for how we understand some otherwise puzzling behaviors in certain neurologically abnormal patients as well as in some nonhuman animals.

PERSONS AND THE EXTENDED-MIND THESIS

Zygon® ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynne Rudder Baker
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

scholarly journals Extended Mental Features

2019 ◽  
pp. 44-55
Author(s):  
Katalin Farkas
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This chapter revisits the question of extending consciousness.

scholarly journals Whatever Next and Close to my Self – The Transparent Senses and the ‘Second Skin’: Implications for the Case of Depersonalisation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ciaunica ◽  
Andreas Roepstorff ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou ◽  
Bruna Petreca
Keyword(s):  
Prior Information ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
Spatial Dimension ◽  
The Self ◽  
Extended Body ◽  
Seminal Paper ◽  
Sensory Inputs ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

In his seminal paper ‘Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science’ Andy Clark (2013) argued that the brain’s job is to predict whatever information is coming ‘next’ on the basis of the prior information perceived before. In this paper we suggest that term ‘next’ should be understood not only at the temporal scale (i.e. what is perceived in the upcoming second); but (ii) also from a spatial dimension (i.e. what is perceived literally next to or close-to-my-body). We examine the perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs which have a key impact on the organism’s survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences that extend to the immediate objects/materials that envelop closely our skin, namely clothes. One relatively overlooked aspect of our experiences is that humans in modern societies spend most of their lives having their bodies closely enveloped by materials/textile. Following the seminal ‘extended mind’ thesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein 2019), we argue that these materials may be conceived as a ‘second skin’ or ‘extended skin’ that underwrite what we will call here ‘extended body-image’ and ‘extended body-schema’ (cf. Gallagher 2005). We argue that tactile experiences – mediated by the skin and the ‘extended skin’ – may be viewed as a ‘transparent bridge’ intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. Contrary to the standard approach that views the skin (and tactile experiences) as a mere border separating the self and world, here we propose that the skin (and its extended version, ‘the second skin’, i.e. the clothes) simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalisation Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from one’s self, body and the world.

The Extended Mind Thesis

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Mirko Farina ◽  
Andy Clark
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

From Content-Externalism to Vehicle-Externalism

Dialogue ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Crystal L’hote
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Parity Principle ◽  
Content Externalism ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis ◽  
Vehicle Externalism

ABSTRACT: Consensus has it that Putnam-Burge style arguments for content-externalism do not strengthen the case for vehicle-externalism, i.e., the thesis that some mental states include as their parts notebooks, iPhones, and other extra-bodily phenomena. Rowlands and Sprevak, among others, argue that vehicle-externalism gets stronger support from Clark and Chalmers’s parity principle and functionalism, generally. I contest this assessment and thereby give reason to reconsider the support that content-externalism provides the extended mind thesis: although content-externalism does not entail vehicle-externalism, as Rowlands argues, neither does functionalism. The functionalist cannot reject the content-externalist argument for vehicle-externalism on these grounds without undercutting her own.

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