scholarly journals Extended Mental Features

2019 ◽  
pp. 44-55
Author(s):  
Katalin Farkas
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This chapter revisits the question of extending consciousness.

scholarly journals Whatever Next and Close to my Self – The Transparent Senses and the ‘Second Skin’: Implications for the Case of Depersonalisation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ciaunica ◽  
Andreas Roepstorff ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou ◽  
Bruna Petreca
Keyword(s):  
Prior Information ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
Spatial Dimension ◽  
The Self ◽  
Extended Body ◽  
Seminal Paper ◽  
Sensory Inputs ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

In his seminal paper ‘Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science’ Andy Clark (2013) argued that the brain’s job is to predict whatever information is coming ‘next’ on the basis of the prior information perceived before. In this paper we suggest that term ‘next’ should be understood not only at the temporal scale (i.e. what is perceived in the upcoming second); but (ii) also from a spatial dimension (i.e. what is perceived literally next to or close-to-my-body). We examine the perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs which have a key impact on the organism’s survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences that extend to the immediate objects/materials that envelop closely our skin, namely clothes. One relatively overlooked aspect of our experiences is that humans in modern societies spend most of their lives having their bodies closely enveloped by materials/textile. Following the seminal ‘extended mind’ thesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein 2019), we argue that these materials may be conceived as a ‘second skin’ or ‘extended skin’ that underwrite what we will call here ‘extended body-image’ and ‘extended body-schema’ (cf. Gallagher 2005). We argue that tactile experiences – mediated by the skin and the ‘extended skin’ – may be viewed as a ‘transparent bridge’ intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. Contrary to the standard approach that views the skin (and tactile experiences) as a mere border separating the self and world, here we propose that the skin (and its extended version, ‘the second skin’, i.e. the clothes) simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalisation Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from one’s self, body and the world.

Taking iPhone Seriously

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Record ◽  
Boaz Miller
Keyword(s):  
Digital Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Everyday Activities ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

David Chalmers thinks his iPhone exemplifies the extended-mind thesis by meeting the criteria that he and Andy Clark established in their well-known paper (1998). Andy Clark agrees. This chapter takes this proposal seriously, evaluating the case of the GPS-enabled smartphone as a potential mind extender. It is argued here that the “trust and glue” criteria enumerated by Clark and Chalmers are incompatible with both the epistemic responsibilities that accompany everyday activities and the practices of trust that enable users to discharge them. Prospects for revision of the original criteria are dim. The chapter therefore calls for a rejection of the trust criterion and a reevaluation of the extended-mind thesis. It also addresses the extended mind, extended knowledge, digital technology and devices, varying stakes and GESs.

Can Consciousness Extend?

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-264
Author(s):  
Karina Vold ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Popular Belief ◽  
Nervous Systems ◽  
Robust Version ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Different Shapes ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Cognitive Niches ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis prompted philosophers to think about the different shapes our minds can take as they reach beyond our brains and stretch into new technologies. Some of us rely heavily on the environment to scaffold our cognition, reorganizing our homes into rich cognitive niches, for example, or using our smartphones as swiss-army knives for cognition. But the thesis also prompts us to think about other varieties of minds and the unique forms they take. What are we to make of the exotic distributed nervous systems we see in octopuses, for example, or the complex collectives of bees? In this paper, I will argue for a robust version of the extended mind thesis that includes the possibility of extended consciousness. This thesis will open up new ways of understanding the different forms that conscious minds can take, whether human or nonhuman. The thesis will also challenge the popular belief that consciousness exists exclusively in the brain. Furthermore, despite the attention that the extended mind thesis has received, there has been relatively less written about the possibility of extended consciousness. A number of prominent defenders of the extended mind thesis have even called the idea of extended consciousness implausible. I will argue, however, that extended consciousness is a viable theory and it follows from the same ‘parity argument’ that Clark and Chalmers (1998) first advanced to support the extended mind thesis. What is more, it may even provide us with a valuable paradigm for how we understand some otherwise puzzling behaviors in certain neurologically abnormal patients as well as in some nonhuman animals.

scholarly journals Economic cognitive institutions

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 747-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Petracca ◽  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Shared Mental Models ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
The Social ◽  
Douglass North

AbstractThis paper introduces the notion of ‘cognitive’ institution and discusses its relevance to institutional economics. Cognitive institutions are conceptually founded on the philosophy of mind notion of extended mind, broadened to also include the distinctly social, institutional, and normative dimensions. Cognitive institutions are defined as institutions that not just allow agents to perform certain cognitive processes in the social domain but, more importantly, without which some of the agents' cognitive processes would not exist or even be possible. The externalist point of view of the extended mind has already had some influence in institutional economics: Arthur Denzau and Douglass North first introduced the notion of institution understood in terms of ‘shared mental models’, and relatedly philosopher Andy Clark introduced the notion of ‘scaffolding institution’. We discuss shared mental models and scaffolding institutions and go a step further by showing that the notion of cognitive institution can capture more fundamental and salient aspects of economic institutions. In particular, we focus on the market as an economic cognitive institution.

PERSONS AND THE EXTENDED-MIND THESIS

Zygon® ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynne Rudder Baker
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

scholarly journals Andy Clark and His Critics

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Distributed Processing ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Cognitive Scientist ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Opening Up ◽  
Intense Debate

Andy Clark is a leading philosopher and cognitive scientist. The fruits of his work have been diverse and lasting. They have had an extraordinary impact throughout philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and robotics. The extended mind hypothesis, the power of parallel distributed processing, the role of language in opening up novel paths for thinking, the flexible interface between biological minds and artificial technologies, the significance of representation in explanations of intelligent behaviour, the promise of the predictive processing framework to unify the cognitive sciences: these are just some of the ideas explored in Clark’s work that have been picked up by many researchers and that have been contributing to intense debate across the sciences of mind and brain. This volume provides the first interdisciplinary, critical engagement with Clark’s work; it includes contributions of authors from several disciplines, offering a fresh perspective on key questions in the sciences of mind and brain.

scholarly journals Extended self

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
The Self ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Extended Self ◽  
Demarcation Line ◽  
Psychological Continuity ◽  
Group Minds ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis

In this paper I aim to show that in the debate about the nature of the self one concept, the concept of the cognitive self, has a theoretical primacy over other conceptual alternatives because of its connection with the concept of a person in the debate about personal identity. Consequently, I will offer a defence of the hypothesis that the Extended Mind thesis implies the Extended Cognitive Self thesis if we additionally assume Parfit?s Psychological criterium of personal identity. After I consider several counterarguments to the claim that the Extended Mind implies the Extended Self, I will offer their criticism and show that they either distort the original Extended Mind thesis or introduce hardly defensible metaphysical assumptions. To one such assumption, that claims that one mind can contain another, I will pay special attention. By careful examination it will be shown that such assumption can be kept only if the relation between the mereologically connected minds is such that prevents psychological continuity between them, while it has to be abandoned if there is a psychological continuity between such minds because it would produce numerous problems such as the problem of too many thinkers, the proliferation of minds, the concept of the person would become useless, etc. Also, these considerations will lead us to the clear demarcation line between those approaches that claim the possibility of group minds and those that claim that there are extended minds. Their key difference will be in taking contrary stances towards the relation of psychological continuity when it comes to different wide minds and their biological constituents. This will be one of the main results of this paper, together with the defence of the Extended Cognitive Self thesis.

The Extended Mind Thesis

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Mirko Farina ◽  
Andy Clark
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Extended Mind Thesis
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