Myths and Facts on Corona, Myths Related to Cure, Drugs, Measures

As of late toward the finish of 2019, another illness was found in Wuhan, China. This illness was analyzed to be brought about by another kind of Covid and influenced nearly the entire world. Chinese scientists named this novel infection as 2019-nCov or Wuhan-Covid. Notwithstanding, to try not to misjudge the World Health Organization commotions it as COVID-19 infection while interfacing with the media COVID-19 is new internationally just as in India. This has upset peoples and group minds. There are different gossips and tidbits about the Covid in Indian culture which causes alarm in neighborhoods and people group minds. It is the need of society to know legends and realities about Covid to lessen the frenzy and make the correct preparatory moves for our security against the Covid. Subsequently, this article attempts to bring to the open fantasies and present current realities to the ordinary citizens. We have to confirm fantasies spreading through online media and keep our selves prepared with realities and be confident of what we know and do at this COVID 19 era at individual levels. Fitting these activities in individual minds across nations is bound to benefit the whole world.

Extended self

In this paper I aim to show that in the debate about the nature of the self one concept, the concept of the cognitive self, has a theoretical primacy over other conceptual alternatives because of its connection with the concept of a person in the debate about personal identity. Consequently, I will offer a defence of the hypothesis that the Extended Mind thesis implies the Extended Cognitive Self thesis if we additionally assume Parfit?s Psychological criterium of personal identity. After I consider several counterarguments to the claim that the Extended Mind implies the Extended Self, I will offer their criticism and show that they either distort the original Extended Mind thesis or introduce hardly defensible metaphysical assumptions. To one such assumption, that claims that one mind can contain another, I will pay special attention. By careful examination it will be shown that such assumption can be kept only if the relation between the mereologically connected minds is such that prevents psychological continuity between them, while it has to be abandoned if there is a psychological continuity between such minds because it would produce numerous problems such as the problem of too many thinkers, the proliferation of minds, the concept of the person would become useless, etc. Also, these considerations will lead us to the clear demarcation line between those approaches that claim the possibility of group minds and those that claim that there are extended minds. Their key difference will be in taking contrary stances towards the relation of psychological continuity when it comes to different wide minds and their biological constituents. This will be one of the main results of this paper, together with the defence of the Extended Cognitive Self thesis.

Reality

Following a naturalistic approach to metaphysics, this chapter argues that materialism and scientific realism are much more plausible than their major alternatives: idealism and social constructivism. The appropriate philosophical method is to use inference to the best explanation of evidence rather than thought experiments and a priori speculation. Natural philosophy legitimately accepts the existence of objects, properties, relations, changes, events, processes, mechanisms, groups, space, and time. All of these concepts and hypotheses are subject to revision as science and philosophy generate more evidence and alternatives. However, skepticism is appropriate concerning the existence of other entities such as souls, gods, spirits, facts, and group minds. If evidence and inference to the best explanation support the existence of an entity, then we are justified in concluding that it exists.

Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is the shared or mutual understanding among agents. Edmond Husserl first developed the concept of intersubjectivity as a critique of René Descartes’ problem of other minds. Husserl argued that the problem of other minds portrayed human interaction as inappropriately solipsistic. More recently, the concept of intersubjectivity has played a role in phenomenological accounts of social cognition, embodied and enactive cognition, debates about whether we can directly perceive others’ mental states, collective intentionality, and group minds.

The Concept of the Individual and Its Scope

This chapter discusses the implications of Spinoza’s concept of individual bodies, as introduced in the definition of individuum in the physical digression. It begins by showing that this definition allows for an extremely wide application of the term; accordingly, very different sorts of physical entities can be described as Spinozistic individuals. Given the quite distinct use of the terms divisibilis and indivisibilis in his metaphysics, however, the chapter argues that the physical concept of individuality is not universally applied in the Ethics but reserved for physical or natural-philosophical considerations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problem of collective individuals. It is argued that, while societies or states are described as individual bodies, they do not constitute individual group minds in the strict sense of the term for Spinoza. This in turn indicates that minds are not individuated in the same way as bodies.