Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.

Download Full-text

Change Your Look, Change Your Luck: Religious Self-Transformation and Brute Luck Egalitarianism

Res Philosophica ◽

10.11612/resphil.2015.92.2.13 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 92 (2) ◽

pp. 453-471 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Muhammad Velji

Keyword(s):

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Brute Luck

Download Full-text

On Dworkin’s brute-luck–option-luck distinction and the consistency of brute-luck egalitarianism

Politics Philosophy & Economics ◽

10.1177/1470594x04046243 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 283-312 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Martin E. Sandbu

Keyword(s):

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Brute Luck ◽

Option Luck

Download Full-text

Dworkin and Luck Egalitarianism

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199645121.013.4 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Richard J. Arneson

Keyword(s):

Distributive Justice ◽

Alternative View ◽

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Ronald Dworkin ◽

Founding Father ◽

Brute Luck

Ronald Dworkin is a founding father of what has come to be called “luck egalitarianism,” a family of distributive justice doctrines that hold that the inequalities in people’s condition that are brought about by sheer brute luck falling on them in ways that are beyond their power to control should be reduced or eliminated, but that inequalities that arise through people’s own fault or choice, such that they can reasonably be deemed responsible for their condition, need not be reduced or eliminated. Dworkin himself has come to embrace an alternative view, “justice as fair insurance.” This chapter characterizes Dworkin’s view, compares it to luck egalitarianism, and criticizes both doctrines.

Download Full-text

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

Economics and Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0266267118000226 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 35 (02) ◽

pp. 259-281 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Greg Bognar

Keyword(s):

Individual Responsibility ◽

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Brute Luck ◽

Luck Egalitarians ◽

Option Luck ◽

As If

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Download Full-text

What is Arbitrary about Moral Arbitrariness?

Strokes of Luck ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198868507.003.0008 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 202-233

Author(s):

Gerald Lang

Keyword(s):

Original Position ◽

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Veil Of Ignorance ◽

Central Source ◽

Justice As Fairness ◽

Brute Luck ◽

Principles Of Justice ◽

The Veil ◽

Selection Of ◽

Refined Version

John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is often cited as a central source of inspiration for luck egalitarianism, which is, correlatively, often characterized as a more refined version of justice as fairness. Rawls’s distributive hostility to morally arbitrary endowments is standardly interpreted as betraying hostility to distributions that are skewed by brute luck. This chapter argues otherwise. It has two main aims. First, it replaces the standard ‘Neutralization Interpretation’ of Rawls’s main arguments with the ‘Irrelevance Interpretation’. According to the Irrelevance Interpretation, morally arbitrary person endowments ought to play no role in the selection of principles of justice in the original position. According to the Neutralization Interpretation, by contrast, principles of justice ought to expunge the influence of any inequalities that are due to luck. The Irrelevance Interpretation is more permissive of inequalities, just as long as they serve some other purpose, such as improving the position of the worst-off. The Irrelevance Interpretation is also more congenial to Rawls’s investment in the contractarian machinery of the original position and the veil of ignorance.

Download Full-text

Immigrants, Multiculturalism, and Expensive Cultural Tastes: Quong on Luck Egalitarianism and Cultural Minority Rights

Les ateliers de l éthique ◽

10.7202/1008037ar ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

pp. 176-192

Author(s):

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

Keyword(s):

Minority Rights ◽

Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Cultural Minority ◽

Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽

Cultural Justice ◽

Luck Egalitarian

Kymlicka has offered an influential luck egalitarian justification for a catalogue of polyethnic rights addressing cultural disadvantages of immigrant minorities. In response, Quong argues that while the items on the list are justified, in the light of the fact that the relevant disadvantages of immigrants result from their choice to immigrate, (i) these rights cannot be derived from luck egalitarianism and (ii) that this casts doubt on luck egalitarianism as a theory of cultural justice. As an alternative to Kymlicka’s argument, Quong offers his own justification of polyethnic rights based on a Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity. I defend luck egalitarianism against Quong’s objection arguing that if choice ever matters, it matters in relation to cultural disadvantages too. Also, the Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity cannot justify the sort of polyethnic rights that Quong wants it to justify, once we set aside an unwarranted statist focus in Quong’s conception of fair equality of opportunity. Whatever the weaknesses of luck egalitarianism are, the inadequacy of the position in relation to accommodating cultural disadvantages of immigrants is not among them.

Download Full-text