scholarly journals Immigrants, Multiculturalism, and Expensive Cultural Tastes: Quong on Luck Egalitarianism and Cultural Minority Rights

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Minority Rights ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Cultural Minority ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Cultural Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

Kymlicka has offered an influential luck egalitarian justification for a catalogue of polyethnic rights addressing cultural disadvantages of immigrant minorities. In response, Quong argues that while the items on the list are justified, in the light of the fact that the relevant disadvantages of immigrants result from their choice to immigrate, (i) these rights cannot be derived from luck egalitarianism and (ii) that this casts doubt on luck egalitarianism as a theory of cultural justice. As an alternative to Kymlicka’s argument, Quong offers his own justification of polyethnic rights based on a Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity. I defend luck egalitarianism against Quong’s objection arguing that if choice ever matters, it matters in relation to cultural disadvantages too. Also, the Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity cannot justify the sort of polyethnic rights that Quong wants it to justify, once we set aside an unwarranted statist focus in Quong’s conception of fair equality of opportunity. Whatever the weaknesses of luck egalitarianism are, the inadequacy of the position in relation to accommodating cultural disadvantages of immigrants is not among them.

scholarly journals The Social Injustice of Parental Imprisonment

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-320
Author(s):  
William Bülow ◽  
Lars Lindblom
Keyword(s):  
Social Injustice ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Common View ◽  
The Social ◽  
Children Of Prisoners ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Many ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

AbstractChildren of prisoners are often negatively affected by their parents’ incarceration, which raises issues of justice. A common view is that the many negative effects associated with parental imprisonment are unjust, simply because children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed or unjustly punished by their parents’ incarceration. We argue that proposals of this kind have problems with accounting for cases where it is intuitive that prison might create social injustices for children of prisoners. Therefore, we suggest that in addition to the question of whether children of prisoners are impermissibly harmed, we should ask whether the inequalities that these children endure because of their parent’s incarceration are objectionable from a social justice perspective. To answer this latter question, we examine the negative effects associated with parental imprisonment from the perspective of luck egalitarianism. We develop a luck egalitarian account that incorporates insights from the philosophy of childhood. On our account, children of prisoners might endure two different types of objectionable inequalities, since they are often deprived of resources that are important for ensuring fair equality of opportunity in adulthood, but also because they are likely to suffer inequalities in terms of childhood welfare. After defending this account, we explore its implications for policy.

Inheritance and Luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Mediating Effects ◽  
Inherited Wealth ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.

Fair Equality of Opportunity

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 197-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry A. Alexander ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity

Social Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-122
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Integration Policies ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Multicultural Policies

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.

Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 133-147
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Early Appearance ◽  
The Social ◽  
Egalitarian Theory ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls famously noted that many (dis)advantages reflect the outcomes of the social and the natural lottery. In these remarks, inter alia, some have seen the early appearance in Rawls’s work of what was later developed into a full-blown luck egalitarian theory of justice. Luck egalitarianism says that it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no choice or fault of their own. This principle differs from Rawls’s theory of justice. This had led some political philosophers to criticize Rawls for not thinking through the implications of his luck egalitarian commitments. This chapter (1) presents conflicting interpretations of the role considerations about luck play in Rawls; (2) assesses the exegetical support on offer for these interpretations; and, finally, (3) discusses what role considerations about luck should play in a theory of justice in the light of recent relational egalitarian theories.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Children’s Distributive Outcomes: Equality of Opportunity?

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-158
Author(s):  
Timothy Fowler ◽  
Timothy Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Children’S Wellbeing ◽  
The World ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Priority View

In this chapter, I consider the extent to which my account supports equality of opportunity, understood roughly in the Rawlsian sense known as FEO (Fair Equality of Opportunity). FEO seems inconsistent with the priority view defended in Section 2. However, I argue there are powerful reasons of justice to think that justice requires limiting the ability of parents to pass on economic advantages to their children. I show an argument for equalising opportunity flows from my account of children’s wellbeing. I argue that children’s social relations with one another are dependent upon FEO, and in particular that children interact with the world as agents. This means that their lives take the shape they do because of their own actions and abilities.

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