For more United Nations rule-of-law “win-win” technical assistance outcomes amid migration

This article focuses on the universal and time-honored Golden Rule, collo- quially known as “win-win”– a technical cooperation strategy, pursued in crime prevention and other fields. In particular, the article ventures into John Rawls’s difference principle for the United Nations-inspired Rule- of-Law cooperation for crime prevention to meet sustainable development goal 10 of the 2030 United Nations Agenda (“Reduce inequality within and among countries”). His liberally egalitarian principle regards inequality as reasonable (justice as fairness) as long as it would make the least advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equality. In line with the United Nations Charter establishing the duty to cooperate, the author looks into the principle’s Global North-South applicability, relevant especially for the Rule-of-Law impact on the benefactors and beneficiaries of the two major economic development initiatives: the 2019–2021 Blue Dot Network/Built Back Better World (BDN/B3W) and the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both prone to migration flows. In their context he offers intercultural rationale and suggestions for a North-South crime prevention technical cooperation glocal86 approach that should be programmatically driven by universally relevant anti-corruption. Finally, the author alerts to the need of bringing into the North-South technical cooperation relationship people’s regard of Mother Earth (“triple wins”) and strategize that cooperation accordingly for a truly better world.

The basic liberties: An essay on analytical specification

We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the ‘analytical’ method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e. the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas.

Rawls’ traces in contemporary philosophy of education

This article examines the many traces of John Rawls’ theory of justice in contemporary philosophy of education. Beyond work that directly explores the educational implications of justice as fairness and political liberalism, there are many interesting debates in philosophy of education that make use of Rawlsian concepts to defend views that go well beyond those advocated in justice as fairness. There have also been methodological debates on Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory which concern the proper balance between empirically informed discussion and fruitful normative reflection.

Justice and the Reform of International Investment Law

This paper focuses on the reforms proposed to investment law, in particular in relation to dispute resolution, from the standpoint of justice. It sets out the ways that the proposed adoption of a standing investment court with an appellate instance would impact the justice of the international investment law system by focusing on the notion of justice as fairness. By assessing the impacts of the proposed changes’ limits on the discourse about investment law, I argue that the effects of the proposed reforms will dampen tribunal exchanges about contentious legal interpretations. This will not move the system closer to a fully just international order because the core values are not ones of discourse but rather those of protecting state sovereignty. Justice, if it follows, will be only that which fits within the framework of heightened sovereign power.

Strokes of Luck

Strokes of Luck offers a large-scale treatment of the role of luck in our judgements about blameworthiness and responsibility, in moral philosophy, and in principles of distributive justice, in political philosophy. It takes an ‘anti-anti-luckist’ stance on these matters, and is opposed to the influential ‘anti-luckist’ views which hold that judgements of blameworthiness, or distributive relations, should be adjusted to annul or neutralize differential luck. It provides a new reading of Bernard Williams’s famous essay ‘Moral Luck’ which emphasizes the dissimilarity of Williams’s aims from the aims of Thomas Nagel and his intellectual descendants. It contends that luck egalitarianism is a structurally flawed programme, and it argues for a revised understanding of John Rawls’s justice as fairness that interprets Rawls’s hostility to factors that are ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’ in a novel way stationed more closely to his contractarian apparatus, and less closely to luck egalitarian concerns.

Justice and Arbitrary Boundaries

This chapter deals with three problems of discrimination, arising from our membership of certain communities. The first of these concerns the debate between cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans about international justice. It is just a lucky accident that we were born where we were, but these arbitrary facts can make a huge difference to life chances. Rawlsian non-cosmopolitans thus risk a charge of incoherence if they combine an acceptance of these sources of arbitrariness with a commitment to anti-arbitrariness principles of justice. The Irrelevance Interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness advanced in Chapter 7 is used to defuse this charge of incoherence. The second problem concerns the ‘basic equality’ project of establishing robust foundations for human moral equality by locating a morally significant property that every human possesses, and possesses equally. It is contended that the basic equality project is wrongheaded, and that we need not worry about descriptive inequalities among human beings. The third problem concerns interspecies relations and the charge of ‘speciesism’. It is maintained that much anti-speciesist literature rests upon the doctrine of ‘moral individualism’, and that this doctrine is severely flawed. To come to a satisfactory view of what we owe to each other, we need to pay attention to both the properties individuals possess, and also the properties they lack. To do that, in turn, requires that these individuals be situated in certain communities, including species-specific communities.

What is Arbitrary about Moral Arbitrariness?

John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is often cited as a central source of inspiration for luck egalitarianism, which is, correlatively, often characterized as a more refined version of justice as fairness. Rawls’s distributive hostility to morally arbitrary endowments is standardly interpreted as betraying hostility to distributions that are skewed by brute luck. This chapter argues otherwise. It has two main aims. First, it replaces the standard ‘Neutralization Interpretation’ of Rawls’s main arguments with the ‘Irrelevance Interpretation’. According to the Irrelevance Interpretation, morally arbitrary person endowments ought to play no role in the selection of principles of justice in the original position. According to the Neutralization Interpretation, by contrast, principles of justice ought to expunge the influence of any inequalities that are due to luck. The Irrelevance Interpretation is more permissive of inequalities, just as long as they serve some other purpose, such as improving the position of the worst-off. The Irrelevance Interpretation is also more congenial to Rawls’s investment in the contractarian machinery of the original position and the veil of ignorance.

Why Strict Compliance?

John Rawls defines ideal theory in terms of a strict compliance assumption. The standard interpretation of ideal theory is telic: the function of the strict compliance assumption is to help specify a realistic utopia as a telos for political decision making. The chapter defends an alternative, deontic interpretation of ideal theory, one based on the fundamental Rawlsian idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation. It claims that the participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme are mutually accountable in that they have the standing to make demands of one another. It argues that the logic of these moral demands implies that the rules of any cooperative scheme must be justified on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. Since society as a whole constitutes a cooperative scheme in justice as fairness, the same conclusion holds of its principles of justice. The chapter also defends the possibility of a non-utopian ideal theory.

A REVIEW ON RAWLS THEORY OF JUSTICE

Justice is an abstract idea and understanding the core concept of various types of justice will help scholars, lawyers and law enforcement to develop and use the theory for legislative drafting, judicial review, case review, in court defense, and legal research and writing. In this paper we discussed the essence of Rawls Justice, the implication and compared it to other theories of justice. Therefore this paper will focused on examining and reviewing John Rawls idea of Justice and how to implement it in society. The method used in this study is doctrinal legal research. The result of this study while we discussed that the three Rawls principles cannot be realized together because one principle collides with another. Rawls prioritizes that the principle of the equal liberty which is lexically maximized precedes the second and third principles. However we believe Justice as Fairness in action should not mean that there is equality but rather emphasizes the concept of balance for the law in providing justice.