Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Zufall: Die Bedeutung von Risikoakzeptanz für den Glücksegalitarismus

Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities. Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles (Dworkin: option luck). But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble?

Justice, Luck, and Pairwise Comparisons

This chapter extends the anti-anti-luckist programme to political philosophy, and to the doctrine of luck egalitarianism in particular. Luck egalitarianism affirms that unchosen relative inequalities between agents are unjust. It condemns inequalities that are due to ‘brute luck’, and upholds inequalities that are due to ‘option luck’. Though it can be easily enough stated, luck egalitarianism is actually a complex theory with two separate components: egalitarianism and anti-luckism. Standard luck egalitarianism’s commitment to pairwise comparisons makes it vulnerable to what Susan Hurley calls the ‘Boring Problem’. The Boring Problem points out that any two agents in a pairwise comparison are bound to lack control over the relevant income gap between them, because each of them controls, at best, only one side of that comparison. Though Hurley herself is relatively dismissive of the Boring Problem, it is contended here that, when it is properly appreciated, it inflicts huge damage on luck egalitarianism, which needs in turn to be re-organized as a ‘baseline-sensitive’ theory that dispenses with pairwise comparisons. Baseline-sensitive luck egalitarianism makes decent progress on a number of critical fronts, particularly Saul Smilansky’s ‘Paradox of the Baseline’. But even this form of luck egalitarianism is still open to a worry about how it understands the relationship between its egalitarian default and its case for permissible inequalities, and it has less to say than it should about the structural aspects of a social system that generate inequalities.

Luck Egalitarianism: Two Lines of Critique

This article is devoted to the stream in political philosophy which came to be known as “luck egalitarianism”. Luck egalitarians are concerned with the questions of distributive justice; their main idea is that no person should be worse-off due to factors which they are unable to influence. Luck egalitarians express this idea via the dichotomy of brute and option luck. The goal of the article is to describe two main lines of critique which luck egalitarianism encounters, and to assess which one is the most dangerous for this movement. Some authors criticize luck egalitarianism from a moral standpoint. They believe that it is overly cruel towards those who suffer due to unfortunate but free choices, humiliating towards those whom it deems to be worthy of help, and that it contradicts our moral intuitions concerning the question of what do people who engage in socially necessary, yet risky professions, deserve. Another important problem for this trend of political thought has to do with metaphysical criticism. Luck egalitarians claim that a person is not responsible not only for the status of her family, her gender, ethnicity, etc., but also for her talents and abilities. The question arises; is there anything for what a person can be genuinely responsible for? Thus, luck egalitarianism encounters the problem of determinism and free will. This problem threatens the identity of luck egalitarianism: if free will does not exist or if it cannot be identified, then the key dichotomy of brute and option luck is meaningless. The article demonstrates that it is the criticism of the second kind which currently poses the greatest problem for luck egalitarianism.

Exploitation: Bridging Social and Distributive Egalitarianism

Social egalitarians have charged distributive egalitarianism with abandoning the victims of option luck, disrespecting victims of brute luck and misunderstanding the aim of egalitarian justice. Social egalitarians have tended to favour a conception of equality that is concerned with ending oppression and expressing equal respect for everyone. In this article, I argue that what has so far been missing from this debate is the fundamental connection that exists between distributive egalitarianism and a conception of exploitation. Once this connection is understood, we can see that social egalitarians are unfair in their criticisms. Importantly, the connection to exploitation reveals that social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism are not rival positions. When it comes to exploitation, the two positions are able to coordinate and identify two core wrong-making features that form part of an exploitative interaction.

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Equality of resources, risk, and the ideal market

Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin's account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.

HOW GIFTS AND GAMBLES PRESERVE JUSTICE

This paper examines G. A. Cohen's final criticism of Ronald Dworkin's theory ofequality of resources, which targets its treatment of inequalities that arise when some individuals make luckier choices than others make. Rebutting Cohen's argument that suchoption luck inequalitiesfail to be just in an unqualified sense, the paper argues that choice does not merely render inequality legitimate but instead can sometimes make inequality just. It also examines the relationship between Cohen's criticism and the conception of equality developed in his earlier influential paper, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.

Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?

This chapter defends the claim that what recommends an outcome that was achieved by just steps from a just starting point is not, in the general case, itself (unqualified) justice, but the different virtue of legitimacy, or, more precisely, the property that no one can legitimately complain about it. David Miller has claimed that luck egalitarianism is inconsistent with the principal distinction that Cohen tries to draw in the chapter, because luck egalitarianism says: distribute equally, compensating appropriately for luck-induced deficits, and then whatever arises from people's choices is just. However, this suggests that luck egalitarians should not call whatever arises “just,” but merely “legitimate” (in the technical sense of being something that no one can complain about).