Review of Jonathan Dancy, Practial Shape

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1251-1253
Author(s):  
Euan K. H. Metz
Keyword(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

Particularism in Question: an Interview with Jonathan Dancy

Theoria ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREAS LIND ◽  
JOHAN BRÄNNMARK
Keyword(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

Not Sufficiently Neutral?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
First Order ◽  
Buck Passing

Jonathan Dancy, Ulrike Heuer, Jonas Olson, and others have argued that there is reason to reject the buck-passing account of value (BPA) because of its implications for first-order normative ethics. Dancy argues that BPA is inconsistent with certain deontological views. Olson argues that BPA is inconsistent with an attractive way of distinguishing between consequentialism and deontology. Heuer argues that it begs the question against Williams’s internalism about reasons. This chapter argues that Dancy, Olson, and Heuer are mistaken. Others claim that certain versions of BPA are inconsistent with a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes there are. This chapter argues that even global consequentialism should not involve a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are and because of this it is not a problem for BPA that it is inconsistent with a consequentialist view of the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are.

Too Little Value?

2019 ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agents ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
Buck Passing

According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that there are birds that are in a great amount of pleasure in a world where there are no past, present, or future rational agents. There are no reasons for any agents to have pro-attitudes towards the birds’ pleasure, so BPA entails that their pleasure is not valuable, but it is valuable. So, BPA produces too little value. This is a problem for BPA and fitting-attitude accounts of value that has been raised and discussed by Krister Bykvist, Jonathan Dancy, and Andrew Reisner. This chapter motivates and defends two responses to this too little value problem: 1. The trans-world reasons response, according to which the birds’ pleasure is valuable because there are reasons for beings in other worlds to have pro-attitudes towards it; 2. The counterfactual response, according to which the birds’ pleasure is valuable because there would be reasons for agents to have pro-attitudes towards it if they were around.

The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Priority View

According to the No-Priority View (NPV), what it is to be a reason for a pro-attitude cannot be analysed in terms of value but neither can what it is to be good or of value be analysed in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. NPV has been defended by Jonathan Dancy and W. D. Ross. This chapter argues that there are several reasons to accept the buck-passing account of value (BPA) over NPV. First, BPA explains striking correlations between reasons and value that NPV does not. Second, BPA explains why value does not give non-derivative reasons to have pro-attitudes; NPV cannot do this. Third, BPA is more qualitatively parsimonious than NPV, and, as explained in this chapter, there are strong reasons to prefer more to less qualitatively parsimonious theories. Fourth, BPA explains why similar theoretical debates arise about reasons and value; NPV cannot do this. Fifth, BPA is more informative than NPV.

The Real Direction of Dancy’s Moral Particularism

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-612
Author(s):  
Edmund Wall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
The Real ◽  
Moral Valence ◽  
Moral Absolutism ◽  
Reason For Action

Jonathan Dancy, who defends a version of moral particularism, is committed to the view that any feature or reason for action might, in logical terms, have a positive moral valence in one context, a negative moral valence in a different context, and no moral valence at all in yet another context. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that, despite the denial by Dancy that proposed grounding properties with invariant moral valences may play a foundational role in morality, his own approach toward moral reasoning unknowingly assumes such foundational grounding properties. I argue that Dancy’s moral particularism is unknowingly directed toward moral absolutism, and, in making that argument, uncover reasons, admittedly inconclusive, to favor an absolutist ethic.

scholarly journals RESENSI BUKU : Pollock, John L. and Joseph Cruz 2003. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Second Edition. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivanovich Agusta
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
Michael Williams

Bahwa dalam edisi pertama buku ini langsung digolongan menjadi buku klasik, menunjukkan kualitas isinya yang tinggi. Sedangkan edisi kedua ini, selain digunakan sendiri oleh John L. Pollock –profesor filsafat dan ilmu pengetahuan kognitif di Universitas Arizona—untuk mata kuliah Theory of Knowledge (Teori tentang Pengetahuan) yang dia asuh, buku ini juga digunakan di universitas-universitas lain. Telah puluhan buku lain yang menggunakan citasi dari buku ini. Bahkan banyak yang menyatakan bahwa buku ini jauh lebih bagus dalam menerangkan teori-teori pengetahuan dibandingkan dengan buku-buku serupa, bahkan yang terbit beberapa tahun kemudian, misalnya Introduction to ContemporaryEpistemology (1985) karya Jonathan Dancy, Groundless Belief edisi kedua (1999) dan Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction toEpistemology (2001) karya Michael Williams, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (2002) karya Laurence BonJour, dan Knowledge (2001) karya Michael Welbourne (Traiger 2004).

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