The Real Direction of Dancy’s Moral Particularism

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-612
Author(s):  
Edmund Wall

Jonathan Dancy, who defends a version of moral particularism, is committed to the view that any feature or reason for action might, in logical terms, have a positive moral valence in one context, a negative moral valence in a different context, and no moral valence at all in yet another context. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that, despite the denial by Dancy that proposed grounding properties with invariant moral valences may play a foundational role in morality, his own approach toward moral reasoning unknowingly assumes such foundational grounding properties. I argue that Dancy’s moral particularism is unknowingly directed toward moral absolutism, and, in making that argument, uncover reasons, admittedly inconclusive, to favor an absolutist ethic.

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 262-281
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton

Moral particularism of the kind developed by Jonathan Dancy is treated as a topic in meta-ethics. Until it is applied to a suitable type of normative theory criticisms which have assailed it are difficult to rebut. This chapter aims to apply Dancy’s particularism to target centred virtue ethics, showing how many of these criticisms are off the mark. At the core of these criticisms is that of uncodifiability. Virtue ethics is held to be codifiable through the virtue rules which encode virtue-reasons for action, reasons which are argued to be particularist in Dancy’s sense. That is it is possible even for reasons expressed through the thick virtue concepts to switch valence. In the course of the argument a virtue ethical view of right action (the target-centred view) is further developed.


1977 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Maschette
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin

AbstractMoral particularism is a contentious position at present and seems likely to be so for the foreseeable future. In this Introduction, I outline and detail its essential claim, which I take to be, roughly, that what can be a reason that helps to make one action right need not be a reason that always helps to make actions right. This claim challenges a central assumption on which most, if not all, normative ethical theories are supposedly based. We owe this way of characterizing moral particularism to Jonathan Dancy, around whose writings much of the present debate revolves.


1989 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley D. Trevethan ◽  
Lawrence J. Walker

AbstractDifferences in moral reasoning concerning hypothetical versus real-life conflicts were examined with a sample of 44 youths (aged 15–18 years) who were classified as psychopathic, delinquent, or normal. All subjects were individually interviewed and assessed on (a) Hare's Psychopathy Checklist, (b) two of Kohlberg's hypothetical moral dilemmas, and (c) a subject-generated real-life moral dilemma. The results revealed that the normal youths attained a higher level of moral reasoning than either the delinquents or psychopaths. All groups scored lower on the real-life than the hypothetical dilemmas, indicating that hypothetical dilemmas may best elicit a person's level of moral reasoning competence, whereas real-life dilemmas may entail factors that lower the level of reasoning used in a situation of moral conflict. These two dilemma types also were found to elicit differing moral orientations. Finally, psychopaths were found to orient more to egoistic concerns than did delinquents when discussing real-life dilemmas.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph O'Mahoney

AbstractDo normative arguments change what political actors do and if so, how? Rather than using the pure force of abstract moral reasoning, states often try to move the locus of contestation to an arena where they can make practical progress—the evidence or the empirical facts in support of their argument. This paper analyzes how states try to bolster their position first by constructing an argument in which an action represents part of their argument and then by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing. I call this mechanism rhetorical adduction. The paper challenges theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content of normative arguments and diverges from a leading view on argumentation that arguments have their effects through persuasion. Integrating strategic argumentation theory with theory from psychology about how people make choices based on compelling reasons rather than cost-benefit analysis, I also use theory from sociology on how people resolve morally complex situations through the performance of “reality tests.” I illustrate the mechanism using a case from the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when initial resistance to recognizing the putative state of Bangladesh after India's invasion of East Pakistan was reversed as a result of an argument that Indian troop withdrawal meant that international norms were not violated.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Alfano

Abstract Reasoning is the iterative, path-dependent process of asking questions and answering them. Moral reasoning is a species of such reasoning, so it is a matter of asking and answering moral questions, which requires both creativity and curiosity. As such, interventions and practices that help people ask more and better moral questions promise to improve moral reasoning.


Author(s):  
Toshihiko Takita ◽  
Tomonori Naguro ◽  
Toshio Kameie ◽  
Akihiro Iino ◽  
Kichizo Yamamoto

Recently with the increase in advanced age population, the osteoporosis becomes the object of public attention in the field of orthopedics. The surface topography of the bone by scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is one of the most useful means to study the bone metabolism, that is considered to make clear the mechanism of the osteoporosis. Until today many specimen preparation methods for SEM have been reported. They are roughly classified into two; the anorganic preparation and the simple preparation. The former is suitable for observing mineralization, but has the demerit that the real surface of the bone can not be observed and, moreover, the samples prepared by this method are extremely fragile especially in the case of osteoporosis. On the other hand, the latter has the merit that the real information of the bone surface can be obtained, though it is difficult to recognize the functional situation of the bone.


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