Practical Authority and Self-Knowledge

This paper develops an account of practical authority with a view to understanding why obeying authority is somehow problematic. While an authoritative directive may provide a reason for action, as is often thought, it also supplies the content of an intention to act. In this sense, an authority is the author of the content of a subject’s practical knowledge, the knowledge with which the subject acts when obeying. As a consequence, under modestly idealized conditions, a person in authority has knowledge of the mind of the obedient subject in a way that breaks down the self-other asymmetries the subject has to her own mind vis-à-vis others, the sort of asymmetries which philosophers have taken as central to the concept of a person. This consequence suggests a novel explanation of why practical authority is problematic and the obstacles to achieving its legitimacy.

More Right than Wrong

This paper argues that Ross, despite the importance and innovativity of his conception of a prima facie duty, fails entirely to make sense of the relation between prima facie duty, as he understands it, and duty proper. He thus fails to make any sense of what it is to be a moral reason for action, and of right-making and wrong-making properties. Basing my approach on some suggestions of Prichard’s, I suggest that the only way to do this is to abandon any distinct conception of duty proper, restricting ourselves to the idea of what we have most duty to do – what we most ought to do. This retains, but reframes, Ross’s focus on something that is a matter of degree.

Norm as an exclusionary reason for action

Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some practical decision, but there are also second-order reasons which preclude such balancing. Raz's theory starts from the fact that norms are created by authorities whose statements represent (second-order) reasons for action, regardless of their merits and moral acceptability. However, although the norm is valid regardless of its merits, Raz does not deny the importance of legitimacy and morality because he believes that law claims to legitimate moral authority. The first part of this paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of the reasons for action, while the second part focuses on rules as reasons for action. Their uniqueness is visible even intuitively but the author particularly considers Raz's views that a rule is a content-independent and exclusive reason for action. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of authority and the final assessment of the following question: is the norm a strong or an exclusionary reason for action?

Exploring The Role of Halal Certification on Food Companies' Performance in Malaysia

The increase of demands for halal certification is found among food industries in Malaysia. Besides the sales, the authority from state and federal level takes every measures to facilitate the standard and application procedures. The process of halal certification requires commitments from the workers which include trust and integrity. The study explores the important role of halal certification on food industries performance in Malaysia. Halal certification has paved way for the hygiene food and sustainable clean industries that are experienced today. The study uses the Theory of Reason for Action to explain these roles. Literature review methodology is used to explain and explore the new area of research. The findings revealed the important role of halal certification and recommend more food companies to tap the advantage of increasing their sales by making their companies certified in order to make their food hygiene, safe and healthy. This study provides of literatures that have been missing on the study of halal food industries in Malaysia.

Old Times' Sake as a Moral Category

In this paper I discuss the notion of old times’ sake, one which is hardly discussed by moral philosophers, and claim that it serves as a moral reason for us to act on behalf of the people we used to cherish: former friends, colleagues, neighbors, or spouses. While our relationship with them has ended, the building-blocks of our identity will continue to bear their fingerprints, and they will ever be an important part of our biography. Acting for old times’ sake reflects both our caring about them, and our caring about our own past, biography, and accumulated identity. Why the relationship has ceased will of course affect our attitude towards them. Although old times’ sake might not always be a decisive factor, it still serves as a moral reason for action.

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue (PSV). It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons (2014), and then I adapt these concepts so as to render them apt to be used in the formulation I intend to offer. In the third section I present my formulation of the PSV using the concepts introduced in the second section and explain why I believe this formulation is better than the one offered by Vlastos.

A Common Misunderstanding of Intention

The moral act consists of object, intention, and circumstances. The word intention, as commonly used, is often mistaken for the technical meaning of the word intention as employed by philosophers. This produces confusion in the description of moral acts. The common use of intention signifies motive, or one's reason for action. We commonly say that someone has a good intention even though what he or she does is wrong. For example, we describe someone who wants to alleviate suffering, and so euthanizes a patient, as having a good intention. To the contrary, in the Catholic moral tradition, intention means an action that is done voluntarily and knowingly. A nurse who kills a patient has a bad intention because he or she acts freely and with knowledge. Alleviating suffering is indeed a good motive for action, but motives are formulated through deliberation prior to action.

Two Kinds of Reasons

One kind of reason for action is that the action would have a good outcome. According to Act Consequentialism all reasons are like this. However, these ‘act-based’ reasons may be contrasted with ‘pattern-based’ reasons, which flow from the fact that an action is part of some good pattern of action. This chapter argues that both kinds of reasons exist, and explores some of the issues facing any theory of pattern-based reasons. One such issue is whether they can exist in cases where the valuable pattern would not be realized because other agents are unwilling to play their parts. According to idealizing forms of Rule Consequentialism, they can. However, the chapter endorses an argument made by Alexander Dietz that this is incompatible with any plausible account of the strength of pattern-based reasons. It ends by explaining how pattern-based reasons may nevertheless retain their practical significance.

Risky Predictions

Prediction is often seen as explanation’s poor relation. Yet prediction can be more useful than explanation because it is often future-directed and a reason for action. Predictions can still be useful even with a degree of fallibility, which is important since there is no necessity in nature upon which infallible prediction could rest. Indeed, it is an evident weakness of any theory of prediction if it cannot account for the possibility that the very best theory, given the evidence, could still be false.