scholarly journals Paradoxical Aspects of the Russellian Conception of Existence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Usó-Doménech ◽  
J. A. Nescolarde-Selva ◽  
H. Gash
Keyword(s):  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Ontological Problem

AbstractIn this paper, the authors try to clarify the relations between Meinong’s and Russell's thoughts on the ontological ideas of existence. The Meinongian theory on non-existent objects does not in itself violate the principle of non-contradiction, since the problem that this hypothesis offers to the theory of definite descriptions is not so much a logical problem as an ontological problem. To demonstrate this we will establish what we believe are the two main theses basic to the theory of descriptions: the epistemological thesis and logical thesis.

scholarly journals GARDNER'S PARADOX AND THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

ARHE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (34) ◽  
pp. 47-60
Author(s):  
GORAN RUJEVIĆ
Keyword(s):  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Original Version ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

Martin Gardner's two-children paradox posits two scenarios, in one we know that of two children one is a girl, and in the other we know that of two children the older one is a girl. The chances of the other child being a girl is not the same in these two scenarios, in the first being 1 in 3 while in the second they are 1 in 2. Gardner himself believed that the problem of this paradox lies in the ambiguous way the scenarios are articulated. However, it is possible to show that the original version of the paradox provides sufficient content for a meaningful explanation of these unexpected results. Inspired by comments by Leonard Mlodinow, we attempt to provide a comprehensible explanation for this counterintuitive change with help of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions. The difference between the two scenarios then boils down to the difference between indefinite and definite descriptions.

The Logical Form of Descriptions

Dialogue ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Linsky
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Systematic Theory ◽  
Referential Use ◽  
Central Interest ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
The One ◽  
Stephen Neale

Stephen Neale defends Russell's famous theory of definite descriptions against more than 40 years' worth of criticisms beginning long before Strawson's “On Referring.” Ever since Strawson's parting shot in that paper (“… ordinary language has no exact logic”), the theory of descriptions has been a battleground for the larger issue of whether a systematic theory of the semantics of natural language is really possible. Neale provides us with a sketch of part of that project as it currently stands. All of the complexities and irregularities of the use of definite descriptions in natural language can be combined, after all, in a single theory based on an “exact logic.” Neale argues that one can give a Russellian account of “incomplete descriptions” (as in ‘The table is covered with books’), generic uses of ‘the’ (‘The whale is a mammal’), plural descriptions (‘The men carried the piano’) and, of central interest, the purportedly referential uses identified by Donnellan (as in ‘The murderer of Smith is insane’ when it is Jones the accused we have in mind). Neale follows familiar answers to these objections; incorporate demonstratives into the account (to get ‘The table over there …’), distinguish the proposition expressed from the one meant (the “referential” use is what was meant not said), and point out that the problem is not unique to definite descriptions and so cannot be a fault of any particular theory of them (many expressions have generic, plural and “referential” uses).

Descriptions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Neale
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Singular Term ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Subject Noun ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

‘Definite descriptions’ are noun phrases of the form ‘the’ + noun complex (for example, ‘the finest Greek poet’, ‘the cube of five’) or of the form possessive + noun complex (for example, ‘Sparta’s defeat of Athens’). As Russell realized, it is important to philosophy to be clear about the semantics of such expressions. In the sentence ‘Aeschylus fought at Marathon’, the function of the subject, ‘Aeschylus’, is to refer to something; it is a referential noun phrase (or ‘singular term’). By contrast, in the sentence ‘Every Athenian remembers Marathon’, the subject noun phrase, ‘every Athenian’, is not referential but quantificational. Definite descriptions appear at first sight to be referential. Frege treated them referentially, but Russell held that they should be treated quantificationally in accordance with his theory of descriptions, and argued that certain philosophical puzzles were thereby solved.

scholarly journals A Puzzle about Logical Analysis

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Rinner
Keyword(s):  
Complete Solution ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Frege’S Puzzle ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Frege's Puzzle ◽  
Belief Ascriptions

AbstractIn this paper, I will present a puzzle for logical analyses, such as Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions and Recanati’s analysis of ‘that’-clauses. I will argue that together with Kripke’s disquotational principles connecting sincere assent and belief such non-trivial logical analyses lead to contradictions. Following this, I will compare the puzzle about logical analysis with Frege’s puzzle about belief ascriptions. We will see that although the two puzzles do have similarities, the solutions to Frege’s puzzle cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the puzzle about logical analysis. Hence, to say it with Kripke, the main thesis of this paper is that the puzzle is a puzzle. A complete solution to the puzzle promises a better understanding of both logical analyses and belief ascriptions.

Why the Theory of Descriptions?

1996 ◽  
Vol 46 (183) ◽  
pp. 158
Author(s):  
Gideon Makin
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Descriptions
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