Solidarity and Responsibility in the Euro Area: Foes or Friends?

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Fracasso

Abstract The recent debate on the reform of the economic governance in the euro area has been marred by a stark disagreement on the correct sequence between risk-reduction (responsibility) and risk-sharing (solidarity). In fact, the dichotomy between risk-reduction and risk-sharing may be fallacious as they reinforce each other, particularly in a monetary union with no lender of last resort for the public sector and no common macroeconomic stabilization mechanisms. The lack of risk-sharing mechanisms is per se a major source of redenomination and default risks and thus it makes the euro area prone to financial market segmentation along national borders and ultimately weaker. At the same time, greater structural convergence has to be achieved through structural reforms and fiscal prudence in order to reduce the likelihood of future negative idiosyncratic shocks in currently vulnerable countries. Notwithstanding some progress towards a politically viable solution encompassing both responsibility and solidarity, a number of important issues remain controversial. This short article summarizes the debate and introduces some of these controversial issues, ranging from the correct role of market discipline when markets are prone to self-fulfilling prophecies and multiple equilibria, to the (dis)advantages of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms based on rules rather than discretion, from the pros and cons of new safe assets in the euro area to the primacy of coping with debt legacy problems, and the like.

2018 ◽  
pp. 124-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Balassone ◽  
Sara Cecchetti ◽  
Martina Cecioni ◽  
Marika Cioffi ◽  
Wanda Cornacchia ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-90
Author(s):  
Maria Demertzis ◽  
Stavros A Zenios

Abstract The authors provide a novel angle to the ongoing discussions by the G20 on sovereign contingent debt and argue that contingent debt could provide market-based insurance to protect the euro area from future debt crises. Risk-sharing with the markets is a practical way forward in the context of the Franco-German debate on risk-sharing among EU member states vs system-wide risk reduction. The financial innovation of contingent debt is a feasible euro area reform that would not introduce risk-sharing between states or require institutional reforms or Treaty changes. However, coordination would be needed. The authors’ suggestion fills a gap in the proposals on the completion of the banking union and the possible establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF). These proposals offer institutions-based solutions to crises, with the banking union providing safety regulations that will make banking institutions more resilient, while the EMF will be a ‘fire brigade’ to be called on in emergencies. What has not been tapped are the markets, whose tolerant behaviour to sovereign demands encouraged the build up of debt, while their finicky response exacerbated the crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (9) ◽  
pp. 2783-2818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Aguiar ◽  
Manuel Amador

We establish that creditor beliefs regarding future borrowing can be self-fulfilling, leading to multiple equilibria with markedly different debt accumulation patterns. We characterize such indeterminacy in the Eaton-Gersovitz sovereign debt model augmented with long maturity bonds. Two necessary conditions for the multiplicity are (i) the government is more impatient than foreign creditors, and (ii) there are deadweight losses from default. The multiplicity is dynamic and stems from the self-fulfilling beliefs of how future creditors will price bonds; long maturity bonds are therefore a crucial component of the multiplicity. We introduce a third party with deep pockets to discuss the policy implications of this source of multiplicity and identify the potentially perverse consequences of traditional “lender of last resort” policies. (JEL E44, E62, F34, H63, G12)


Author(s):  
Fabrizio Balassone ◽  
Sara Cecchetti ◽  
Martina Cecioni ◽  
Marika Cioffi ◽  
Flavia Corneli ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
pp. 58-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justyna Sikora

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (EA) highlighted shortcomings of its institutional framework – establishment of a monetary union without a central fiscal policy. Although the economic governance in the EA was substantially reformed in the aftermath of the crisis to address its weaknesses, further reforms including some elements of fiscal union are needed to increase resilience of the Economic and Monetary Union to shocks and prevent emergence of economic and financial distress in the future. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, the article analyses potential institutional reforms aimed at solving the sovereign debt crisis in the EA and indicates which proposals are desired and possible to implement. The research method used is a descriptive analysis of reforms proposed in the literature. In the article, the following reform proposals were assessed: the Debt Redemption Fund, European bonds, assigning the European Central Bank the role of the lender of last resort and a fiscal union with an EA fiscal capacity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré

Abstract The debate on the reform of the euro area has confronted those who prioritize “risk reduction” with those who insist on “risk sharing”. Such antagonism is misleading since both items are complements rather than substitutes. It is also insufficient as it misses the core questions of macroeconomic convergence and of the modernization of the subsidiarity concept.


Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.


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