scholarly journals Correction to: Possessing epistemic reasons: the role of rational capacities

2018 ◽  
Vol 176 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-503
Author(s):  
Eva Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons

Religious Beliefs as World-View Beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-25
Author(s):  
Winfried Löffler
Keyword(s):  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
World View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
German Contribution

In this paper, I defend a moderately cognitive account of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are interpreted as “worldview beliefs”, which I explicate as being indispensable to our everyday and scientific practice; my reading is nonetheless distinct from non-cognitivist readings of “worldview belief” which occasionally appear in the literature. I start with a brief analysis of a recent German contribution to the debate which on the one hand (rightly) insists on the priority of epistemic reasons for or against religious beliefs, but on the other hand contends that religious beliefs are worldview beliefs (section 1). This leads me to explicate a special sense of worldview beliefs, as well as their cognitive role (2). After that, I shed some light on a special epistemological characteristic of worldview beliefs, namely the strong involvement of “free certitude” in their acceptance. I explore the implications for the possible role of arguments for worldview beliefs, especially for worldview beliefs concerning theism (3).

Pragmatic Intellectualism

Reasons First ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 168-182
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment

Chapter 8 introduces and defends the default reliance account of the nature of binary belief and the resulting package of views about epistemic reasons—Pragmatic Intellectualism. According to the default reliance account, binary beliefs play the role of giving us something to rely on in reasoning by default—without need to engage in further reasoning about what to rely on. It is argued that the default reliance account predicts and explains the rational inertia of beliefs, and explains why both the risks of error and the availability of further evidence will count as epistemic reasons against belief. The resulting view, Pragmatic Intellectualism, is contrasted with other defenses of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology with respect to the role it grants to knowledge-action principles, the rational stability of belief, the principle of reflection, and pragmatic encroachment on confidence or degreed belief.

The Game of Belief

2020 ◽  
Vol 129 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Maguire ◽  
Jack Woods
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Standard ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Important Sense

It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. To resolve the tension, the authors draw on an analogy with a similar distinction between types of reasons for actions in the context of activities. This motivates a two-level account of the structure of normativity. The account relies upon a further distinction between normative reasons and authoritatively normative reasons. Only the latter constitutively play the functional role of explaining what state one just plain ought to be in. The authors conjecture that all and only practical reasons are authoritative. Hence, in one important sense, all reasons for belief are practical reasons. But this account also preserves the autonomy and importance of epistemic reasons.

Role of dactinomycin in the improved survival of children with Wilms' tumor

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  
Wilms Tumor

Role of the allergist in diagnosis and management of patients with uveitis

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre
Keyword(s):  
Diagnosis And Management

The power of norms to sway fused group members

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winnifred R. Louis ◽  
Craig McGarty ◽  
Emma F. Thomas ◽  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Fathali M. Moghaddam
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Anthropology ◽  
Normative Systems ◽  
Violent Extremism ◽  
Identity Fusion ◽  
Group Members

AbstractWhitehouse adapts insights from evolutionary anthropology to interpret extreme self-sacrifice through the concept of identity fusion. The model neglects the role of normative systems in shaping behaviors, especially in relation to violent extremism. In peaceful groups, increasing fusion will actually decrease extremism. Groups collectively appraise threats and opportunities, actively debate action options, and rarely choose violence toward self or others.

Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study of folk-economic beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
History Of ◽  
Economic Beliefs

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.

The role of affect in feelings of obligation

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefen Beeler-Duden ◽  
Meltem Yucel ◽  
Amrisha Vaish
Keyword(s):  
Positive Emotions ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Sense Of Obligation

Abstract Tomasello offers a compelling account of the emergence of humans’ sense of obligation. We suggest that more needs to be said about the role of affect in the creation of obligations. We also argue that positive emotions such as gratitude evolved to encourage individuals to fulfill cooperative obligations without the negative quality that Tomasello proposes is inherent in obligations.

Refining our understanding of the “elephant in the room”

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Technological Culture

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

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