scholarly journals Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept

2020 ◽  
Vol 177 (12) ◽  
pp. 3833-3860
Author(s):  
Michele Palmira
2021 ◽  
pp. 295-316
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

Six issues are salient in discussions of the first person since 1900: immunity to error through misidentification; the possibility of survival without survival of one’s body; the elusiveness of the self; the role of the first person attitudes in the explanation of action; the first person component in mental concepts; and the role of the first person simulation in explaining the actions of others. Since 1900, there have been accounts both of the nature of the first person concept, and accounts of the nature of subjects of experience. This paper discusses the achievements and limitations of these accounts in addressing the preceding six issues. These issues are also assessed against a wider range of possibilities, both for the first person and for the subject to which it refers, than are considered in this literature.


Author(s):  
David Owens

Following Descartes, philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular, they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first-person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. This chapter agrees that we have this reflective control over our own actions and that this form of practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness, but denies that anything like this is true of belief. The chapter endorses Williams’ claims that the first-person concept is indispensible only to practical reasoning.


Author(s):  
Mark Textor

I would like the reader to take away from this book the following morals.First, Brentano was wrong to say that intentionality is the most distinctive mark of mental phenomena (see PES, 75 [I, 137]). Our conception of mental phenomena in not unified by the thesis that all and only mental acts have an object. It cannot be so unified because the notion of direction or of-ness itself is neither unified nor generally applicable to mental phenomena. Even if intentionality is a first-person concept that one can only come to grasp if one can instantiate and introspectively access mental acts, propositional and interrogative attitudes pose insuperable problems for Brentano’s Thesis....


ASHA Leader ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-72
Author(s):  
Kelli Jeffries Owens
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.


Author(s):  
Matthias Hofer

Abstract. This was a study on the perceived enjoyment of different movie genres. In an online experiment, 176 students were randomly divided into two groups (n = 88) and asked to estimate how much they, their closest friends, and young people in general enjoyed either serious or light-hearted movies. These self–other differences in perceived enjoyment of serious or light-hearted movies were also assessed as a function of differing individual motivations underlying entertainment media consumption. The results showed a clear third-person effect for light-hearted movies and a first-person effect for serious movies. The third-person effect for light-hearted movies was moderated by level of hedonic motivation, as participants with high hedonic motivations did not perceive their own and others’ enjoyment of light-hearted films differently. However, eudaimonic motivations did not moderate first-person perceptions in the case of serious films.


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