scholarly journals Unamuno on making oneself indispensable and having the strength to long for immortality

Author(s):  
Adam Buben

AbstractUnamuno believes that longing for immortality is what motivates nearly all of human behavior. Unfortunately, in a world in which many people despair of ever achieving true personal immortality, we increasingly turn to what he calls mere “shadows of immortality” for comforting ideas about how our names, energy, or basic material substance will carry on in our absence. Unamuno advocates fighting against such despair, staying out of the shadows, and longing for personal immortality even when it seems impossible. Unamuno’s approach to this issue resembles, in a few significant ways, Kierkegaard’s struggle for the cultivation of subjective selfhood. At the same time, it also runs afoul of Nietzsche’s derisive claims about immortality-seekers. Whereas Nietzsche sees longing for immortality as a sign of being too weak to make the most of mortal life, the more Kierkegaardian Unamuno counters that it is a sign of strong appreciation for life to demand, without surrender, that there be more of it. Given the proper understanding of Nietzsche’s claims about the eternal recurrence, I think he and Unamuno might not be quite as far apart as it initially seems. However, exploring the latter’s critique of the former suggests an intriguing way of seeing the contemporary analytic debate about the desirability of immortality. Building on Unamuno’s position, one could argue that pessimism about the value of immortality is actually indicative of a flawed character and an impoverished relationship with life.

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-139
Author(s):  
Han Thomas Adriaenssen ◽  

This paper explores how, according to three early modern philosophers, philosophical theory should relate to our pre-theoretical picture of reality. Though coming from very different backgrounds, the Spanish scholastic, Domingo de Soto, and the English natural philosopher, Kenelm Digby, agreed that an ability to accommodate our pre-theoretical picture of the world and our ordinary way of speaking about reality is a virtue for a philosophical theory. Yet at the same time, they disagreed on what kind of ontology of the material world is implied by these. The Dutch Cartesian, Johannes de Raey, took a very different approach, and argued that the picture of reality we naturally develop from our early days onwards and the language associated with it have their use in domains such as law and medical practice, but are a poor guide to the ontology of the material world. Thus, if we are to arrive at a proper understanding of the nature of matter, we need to move beyond the picture of reality we naturally develop from our early days onwards in order to come to see that the nature of matter consists in bare extension.


1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 878-878 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Hampton Adams

AbstractBehaviorism is but one part of the broader scope of ethnoarchaeological research and must be joined with historical approaches for proper understanding of the past.In her review of Ethnography by Archaeologists edited by Elisabeth Tooker {American Antiquity 49:442-443), Patricia Gilman emphasized one aspect of ethnoarchaeology, behaviorism, and faulted many of the contributors for not presenting general explanations of human behavior. Gilman primarily stresses the synchronic study of modern behavior as an analog for past behavior. While this is certainly a worthwhile endeavor for ethnographers, to equate such research with all of ethnoarchaeology is, I think, unduly restricting the definition. Such research is simply ethnography, because it places the researcher as an observer and interviewer in modern communities, examining behavioral and physical relationships among modern data. Rarely do such studies place this research in any evolutionary or historical framework.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174569162091735 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gijs A. Holleman ◽  
Ignace T. C. Hooge ◽  
Chantal Kemner ◽  
Roy S. Hessels

The main thrust of Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn’s ecological approach is that “the use of real-life complex, dynamic, naturalistic stimuli provides a solid basis for understanding brain and behavior” (p. 851). Although we support the overall goal and objectives of Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn’s approach to “real-life” neuroscience, their review refers to the terms “ecological validity” and “representative design” in a manner different from that originally introduced by Egon Brunswik. Our aim is to clarify Brunswik’s original definitions and briefly explain how these concepts pertain to the larger problem of generalizability, not just for history’s sake, but because we believe that a proper understanding of these concepts is important for researchers who want to understand human behavior and the brain in the context of everyday experience, and because Brunswik’s original ideas may contribute to Shamay-Tsoory and Mendelsohn’s ecological approach. Finally, we argue that the popular and often misused concept of “ecological validity” is ill-formed, lacks specificity, and may even undermine the development of theoretically sound and tractable research.


1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-75
Author(s):  
RALPH H. TURNER
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-171
Author(s):  
SONIA F. OSLER
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 432-432
Author(s):  
RICHARD F. THOMPSON
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRENDAN MAHER
Keyword(s):  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ed Glenn
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document