scholarly journals Fission theories of Original Guilt

Author(s):  
Nikk Effingham

AbstractOne reading of the Doctrine of Original Sin has it that we are guilty of a sin committed by Adam, thousands of years ago. Fission theorists account for this by saying that Adam fissioned after he sinned and that each of us is one of his ‘fission successors’. This paper recaps the current discussion in the literature about this theory, arguing that the proposed version does not work for reasons already raised by Rea and Hudson. I then introduce a new version of fission theory that avoids the Rea-Hudson objection.

1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57
Author(s):  
EILEEN HARRIS
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-173
Author(s):  
Andrzej Lorkowski ◽  
Robert Jeszke

The whole world is currently struggling with one of the most disastrous pandemics to hit in modern times – Covid-19. Individual national governments, the WHO and worldwide media organisations are appealing for humanity to universally stay at home, to limit contact and to stay safe in the ongoing fight against this unseen threat. Economists are concerned about the devastating effect this will have on the markets and possible outcomes. One of the countries suffering from potential destruction of this situation is Poland. In this article we will explain how difficult internal energy transformation is, considering the long-term crisis associated with the extraction and usage of coal, the European Green Deal and current discussion on increasing the EU 2030 climate ambitions. In the face of an ongoing pandemic, the situation becomes even more challenging with each passing day.


2006 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 12-12
Author(s):  
Robert D. Arnott ◽  
Rodney N. Sullivan

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-150
Author(s):  
Henning Nörnberg

This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality.


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