COMMENTARY ON THE UKRAINIAN TRANSLATION OF “INNER EXPERIENCE” BY GEORGES BATAILLE

The commentary is devoted to the Ukrainian translation of «Inner Experience» work by Georges Bataille, the famous French intellectual of the twentieth century. The paper outlines a short history of publications and extensions of «Inner Experience», which is a certain difficulty for the translator and the initial condition for incomplete translation of the work, which was not published in full while its author was alive. The paper is devoted to analysis of the key philosophical terms, the translation of which was problematic: in particular, such concepts as «angoisse» (anxiety), «supplice» (torment), «communication» (communication), «discourse» (discourse), «esprit» (mind),» entendement (understanding), «intelligence» (intelligence), «savoir» (knowledge), «connaissance» (knowledge), «ipse» (not translated) and «ipseité» (self). The concept of «anguish» provides an opportunity to fit Bataille into the existing existentialist-phenomenological tradition (understanding «anguish» as the «anxiety», a key concept in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre works). The concept of supplice is also rich in connotations: it is primarily about the experience of the crucified Christ at the moment of his cry «in eli lama sabachtani» («why have you forsaken me?»). Bataille refers to this biblical story in order to illustrate the inner experience, but not of Christ himself, but of the Christian, who is filled with the Savior’s suffering, both physical and spiritual. Emphasis was placed on anti-discoursiveness and poeticism as key characteristics of Bataille’s writing, which also contributed to the complication of such a task as the translation of the work «Inner Experience». It is stated that both the translator and the reader of «Inner Experience» should come to terms with the style of wasting words, terms, and connotations in this work. This sacrifice was performed by Bataille repeatedly, and not aimlessly: after all, a new generation of philosophers (among whom J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida, J. Kristeva and M. Foucault) found in him a source of inspiration.

Czas jako sposób bycia istoty śmiertelnej — polemika Lévinasa z Heideggerem

The aim of my article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of man immersed in the finite (Heidegger) and on the other hand transcending towards the infinite (Levinas). My task is to extract and analyse the fabulously contrasting moments in the thought of Heidegger and Levinas on the question of the connec-tion and interpenetration of time and death. Both philosophers grow out of the phenomenological tradition, but their analyses of the problem of the connection between time and death go in different directions. The experiences of time and death are inextricably linked, but for Heidegger time is the ontological horizon of being, and for Levinas time is a way of being beyond being. For Heidegger, dying is about coming to the fullness of being. For Levinas, facing death is a struggle and even a war, a transcendence towards the infinite. While for Heidegger death is the completion of the end, for Levinas death means an encounter with radical otherness, it is an opening and not a closing.

Introduction to the Special Issue

The Collegium Phaenomenologicum has met in Umbria, Italy every summer since 1976; only COVID made it pause, and hopefully only temporarily. It has been a forum for deep and broad discussion of the phenomenological tradition; it has also been a place where that tradition has itself been broadened and deepened by generations of thinkers who came to study the classical texts and to do phenomenology. In 2019, over the course of three weeks in July, in three lecture courses, several talks by visiting faculty, twelve text seminars sessions, art workshops, and very many informal talks over dinner, on the terrace, and on long walks through the town of Città di Castello and beyond, the Collegium worked on the question of critical phenomenology.

Feeling as Consciousness of Value

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.

Critical phenomenology and psychiatry

Whereas classical Critical Theory has tended to view phenomenology as inherently uncritical, the recent upsurge of what has become known as critical phenomenology has attempted to show that phenomenological concepts and methods can be used in critical analyses of social and political issues. A recent landmark publication, 50 Concepts for Critical Phenomenology, contains no reference to psychiatry and psychopathology, however. This is an unfortunate omission, since the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry—as we will demonstrate in the present article by surveying and discussing the contribution of Jaspers, Minkowski, Laing, Basaglia, and Fanon—from the outset has practiced critical thinking, be it at the theoretical, interpersonal, institutional, or political level. Fanon is today a recognized figure in critical phenomenology, even if his role in psychiatry might not yet have been appreciated as thoroughly as his anticolonial and antiracist contributions. But as we show, he is part of a long history of critical approaches in psychopathology and psychiatry, which has firm roots in the phenomenological tradition, and which keeps up its critical work today.

Joachim Wach and the Phenomenological Tradition in the Religious Studies

Целью статьи является определение места Иоахима Ваха (1898-1955 гг.) в феноменологической религиоведческой традиции. Для этого проводятся реконструкция концептуальных основ его религиоведческой системы и философский анализ его теории религиозного опыта, анализируются социологические и религиоведческие элементы, наследие Ваха сопоставляется с трудами классиков немецкой феноменологии религии Р. Отто, Ф. Хайлером. В результате исследования доказывается, что теория Иоахима Ваха близка к идее концентрической схемы Ф. Хайлера, но система Хайлера была препарирована и использована им в угоду модной тенденции социологических исследований. Отмечается, что важный момент в учении И. Ваха составляет его представление об отношениях мастера и ученика. Анализируя эту концепцию, можно заключить, что для социологии Ваха важно не то, что общество воздействует на религию, а то, что религия создаёт общество. Описывая центр религии, И. Вах полностью полагался на концепцию нуминозного Р. Отто. Вах убежден, что в самой сути человека заложено нуминозное чувство, которое активизируется при встрече с тем, что он именовал предельной реальностью, Святым или нуминозным. Диалогические отношения человека и предельной реальности - фундамент религиоведческого метода Ваха. В то же время сам процесс религиозного опыта, его характеристики, значение для жизни индивида больше напоминают не Ahndung Я. Фриза, воспринятый Р. Отто, а чувство, описанное У. Джеймсом. The purpose of the article is to determine the place of Joachim Wach (1898-1955) in the tradition of phenomenology of religion. For this purpose, the reconstruction of the conceptual foundations of his religious system and the philosophical analysis of his theory of religious experience are carried out, the sociological and religious elements are analyzed, the legacy of Wach is compared with the works of the classics of the German phenomenology of religion, R. Otto and F. Heiler. The article shows the proximity of this theory to the concentric model, proposed by F. Heiler, but Heiler’s system was dissected and used by Wach in favor of the fashionable trend of sociological research. In his description of the center of religion J. Wach completely relied on the concept of numinous by R. Otto. Wach is convinced that there is a numinous feeling inherent in the very essence of man, which is activated when man faced with Ultimate reality, Holy or Numinous. The dialogical relations of man and Ultimate reality are the foundation of the Wach’s method of religious studies. At the same time, the process of religious experience itself more closely resembles with religious experience in the terms of W. James.

Self-Awareness and the “I” in the Phenomenological Tradition

The Phenomenological tradition is defined by its attempt to rethink the self and self-awareness. This chapter provides an overview of some of the fundamental developments within that tradition running from Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to later writers such as Henry. I begin by sketching the key features: its relationship to naturalistic and transcendental approaches, the centrality of the first person perspective, and the hierarchical model which is central to Phenomenology’s vision of experience. I next introduce the specifics of Phenomenology’s picture of self-awareness, positioning it between the spectatorial model found in Brentano and a Kantian intellectualism. I then turn to some key innovations: Sartre’s notion of non-positional self-consciousness, Heidegger on the links between the self and the social, and finally Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodiment.

Den kvinnliga sopranen i barockrepertoaren

The artistic doctoral project of soprano Kajsa Dahlbäck is in two parts. The theme of the concert series is “The female soprano within the baroque repertoire 1600–1750” and that of the thesis is “Singing-in-the-world – a phenomenological study on the singer’s inner work”. In her concerts, Dahlbäck has performed music from different parts of Europe and particularly from communities with female singers, such as for instance Italian nun convents, Vivaldi’s time at La Pietà in Venice and the court of Swedish Queen Christina in Stockholm and Rome. In her thesis, Dahlbäck shares insights from her experience as a singer specializing in early music as well as the genre’s generally intimate concert and rehearsal atmosphere. Experience texts from rehearsals and concerts have been mirrored against phenomenological theories. The practice-based triadic concept of body–breath– mind is linked to the theoretical singing-in-the-world. Body–breath–mind is the foundation for singing-in-the-world, a synthesis of the phenomenological tradition of Heidegger’s being- in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein), Merleau-Ponty’s being toward-the-world (suis à) and in recent years Škof and Berndtson’s breathing-in-the-world.

Interpretative Frames, Phenomenology, and the Question of the Republican Character of Polish and Czech Dissident Movements of the 1970s and 1980s

The Polish Solidarity movement of 1980–1981 and the Czechoslovak dissident movement both developed an original model of democracy. The dissidents sought to reconcile the tensions between the individual and the community—personal independence and engagement with public affairs—by building a pluralist, debating civic community entrenched in objective values. Calling upon on the phenomenological tradition and the interpretative frames perspective used in social movement studies, the author seeks to interrogate the intellectual roots of the dissident vision of democracy and the reasons behind one of its future interpretations, which viewed it through the lens of the republican political tradition. Drawing on the popularity and the character of the phenomenological tradition, the author explains the differences in the understanding of community in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The COVID-19 Pandemic in Spain: Experiences of Midwives on the Healthcare Frontline

Background: Midwives look after women during pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium. In Spain, the first wave of COVID was particularly virulent. There are few studies about the experiences of midwives providing care during the COVID pandemic and very few have been undertaken in the countries of southern Europe such as Spain. This article sets out to take a more in-depth look at the experiences of midwives who were on the frontline of care during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to identify new needs and resilience strategies that can help midwives. Methods: A qualitative methodology of phenomenological tradition was used, interviewing 10 midwives from primary care, hospital and independent care. Results: After content analysis, three central categories emerged: (a) cascade of emotions; (b) professional occupation and concern for the women; (c) resisting the day-to-day; resilience and resistance strategies. Conclusions: Despite the difficulties, midwives are concerned about the loss of rights and autonomy and about the increased vulnerability of women. Midwives have become aware of the power they have in their actions both in health management and administration, as well as in the care of women, creating strategies to provide dignified care to their users.