scholarly journals Against mereological nihilism

Synthese ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 191 (7) ◽  
pp. 1511-1527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Tallant
Keyword(s):  
Mereological Nihilism

Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism

Metaphysica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-113
Author(s):  
Fabio Patrone
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Mereological Nihilism ◽  
Spatial Dimensions ◽  
Consistent Manner ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Radical Form

AbstractPixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one and the possible worlds), and their relation is a counterpart relation both in different worlds and at different times or different regions of space. In this paper I will provide two models for pixelism: the first one takes pixels to be hypercubes, i. e. four-dimensional cubes, the acceptance of which is conditional on the acceptance of extended simples. The second one considers pixels as points in a four-dimensional space.

Material Objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Sattig
Keyword(s):  
Composite Material ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Mereological Nihilism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Problem Of The Many ◽  
The Many

This Element is a survey of central topics in the metaphysics of material objects. The topics are grouped into four problem spaces. The first concerns how an object's parts are related to the object's existence and to the object's nature, or essence. The second concerns how an object persists through time, how an object is located in spacetime, and how an object changes. The third concerns paradoxes about objects, including paradoxes of coincidence, paradoxes of fission, and the problem of the many. The fourth concerns views with radical consequences regarding the existence of composite material objects, including mereological nihilism, ontological anti-realism, and deflationism.

scholarly journals Is Sider still a perdurantist?

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 111-125
Author(s):  
Nikola Stamenkovic
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
Mereological Nihilism ◽  
The World ◽  
Mereological Fusion ◽  
Temporal Parts ◽  
Theodore Sider ◽  
Four Dimensionalism ◽  
Additional Object

In Writing the Book of the World (2011) Theodore Sider claims that on the fundamental level of reality there are no objects composed of parts, which makes his view a version of mereological nihilism. However, in his previous book entitled Four-Dimensionalism (2001), Sider endorses mereological universalism, the thesis that every class of objects has a mereological fusion, i.e. that there exists an additional object containing those objects as parts, which plays a crucial role in his argument from vagueness in favour of perdurantism, that is the thesis of the existence of temporal parts of material objects. In this paper I will investigate whether Sider can still be a perdurantist in spite of his latest commitment to mereological nihilism.

Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 192 (5) ◽  
pp. 1295-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Mereological Nihilism ◽  
Special Arrangement

Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (263) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Calosi
Keyword(s):  
Mereological Nihilism

scholarly journals Mereological Nihilism: Keeping It Simple

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 278-287
Author(s):  
Simon D. Thunder
Keyword(s):  
Mereological Nihilism

Fundamental Ontology

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Mark Siderits
Keyword(s):  
Buddhist Philosophy ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Mereological Nihilism ◽  
Ultimate Nature

This chapter discusses three crucial metaphysical theses endorsed and argued for by all schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy: mereological nihilism, anti-substantialism, and momentariness. The “neither identical nor distinct” argument for mereological nihilism is presented and evaluated, and its consequence for fundamental ontology—that only entities with intrinsic natures are strictly speaking real—is explored. One important result, that only tropes and not substances as property-possessors belong in our ultimate ontology, is discussed. Two arguments for momentariness are presented: the argument from cessation and an argument from the nature of existence. Out of this investigation there should emerge a clearer picture of the Buddhist conception of just what the ultimate nature of reality would have to be like.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document