Anti-Realisms Local and Global

The Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy rejects the metaphysical realist thesis that there is such a thing as how things are anyway, independently of the concepts we happen to use. While other Buddhist schools claim that such things as persons, trees, and tables are mere useful fictions, they maintain that these fictions are usefully grounded in facts about the ultimate nature of reality. Not so Mādhyamikas, who are pan-fictionalists. They support this stance by seeking to demonstrate that various hypotheses concerning things with intrinsic nature (things that are thus purported to be ultimately real) lead to absurdities. The conclusion one is invited to draw is that all things are empty, that is, devoid of intrinsic nature. Some sample reductios are examined, and various realist objections are considered. Several different interpretations of Madhyamaka anti-realism are discussed, with a semantic non-dualist reading, to the effect that the very idea of ultimate truth is incoherent, being judged the most plausible.

Fundamental Ontology

This chapter discusses three crucial metaphysical theses endorsed and argued for by all schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy: mereological nihilism, anti-substantialism, and momentariness. The “neither identical nor distinct” argument for mereological nihilism is presented and evaluated, and its consequence for fundamental ontology—that only entities with intrinsic natures are strictly speaking real—is explored. One important result, that only tropes and not substances as property-possessors belong in our ultimate ontology, is discussed. Two arguments for momentariness are presented: the argument from cessation and an argument from the nature of existence. Out of this investigation there should emerge a clearer picture of the Buddhist conception of just what the ultimate nature of reality would have to be like.

The Semiotic Approach to Bacterial Chemotaxis

Bacterial chemotaxis is often considered to be a textbook example of the rudimentary semiotic process. As such, it gives an excellent opportunity to better understand both semiosis and biology. Our study reviews this phenomenon in the light of up-to-date scientific knowledge to answer the most basic semiotic questions: what is the sign? What types of signs are there? What is the meaning understood on the molecular level, and by what means can it grow with time? As a case study, the bacterial chemotaxis toward glucose in E. coli species is chosen, and the semiotic framework of Charles Sanders Peirce applied. The analyses provide us with the following results: the sign, in its ultimate nature, is a general process. Bacterial chemotaxis can be understood in terms of Peircean type, symbol, and argument. The meaning on the molecular level is entirely pragmatic and, in this case, reduced to a bacterial response to glucose. A sign can grow through sign generalization, the emergence of different sign categories, the integration of these categories in functional cycles, and the introduction of contextuality. The sign of bacterial chemotaxis extends from the cell signaling pathways up to the population level. The presented results advance our knowledge of sign processing in the context of semiotic evolution.

The Tragedy of the Commons as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Its Relevance for Sustainability Games

In the current battle for sustainability and climate, understanding the nature of sustainability games is of paramount importance, especially to inform appropriate policy actions to contrast the harmful effects of global climate change. Relatedly, there is no consensus in the literature on the proper game-theoretic representation of the so-called Tragedy of the Commons. A number of contributions have questioned the prisoner’s dilemma as an appropriate framework. In this work, we provide a representation that reconciles these two positions, confirming the ultimate nature of the Tragedy as a prisoner’s dilemma, rather than a coordination issue, and discuss the ensuing implications for sustainability policy interventions.

Naturalistic Entheogenics: Précis of Philosophy of Psychedelics

In this précis I summarise the main ideas of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics . The book discusses philosophical issues arising from the therapeutic use of classic psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD. The book is organised around what I call the Comforting Delusion Objection to psychedelic therapy: the concern that this novel and promising treatment relies essentially on the induction of non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs, rendering it epistemically (and perhaps, therefore, ethically) objectionable. In the book I develop a new response to this Objection which involves showing that a popular conception of psychedelics as agents of insight and spirituality is both consistent with a naturalistic worldview and plausible in light of current scientific knowledge. Exotic metaphysical ideas do sometimes come up, but they are not, on closer inspection, the central driver of change in psychedelic therapy. Psychedelics cause therapeutic benefits by altering the sense of self, and changing how people relate to their own minds and lives--not by changing their beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality. Thus, an "Entheogenic Conception" of psychedelics as agents of insight and spirituality can be reconciled with naturalism (the philosophical position that the natural world is all there is). Controlled psychedelic use can lead to genuine forms of knowledge gain and spiritual growth--even if no Cosmic Consciousness or divine Reality exists.

Compassion As an Intervention to Attune to Universal Suffering of Self and Others in Conflicts: A Translational Framework

As interpersonal, racial, social, and international conflicts intensify in the world, it is important to safeguard the mental health of individuals affected by them. According to a Buddhist notion “if you want others to be happy, practice compassion; if you want to be happy, practice compassion,” compassion practice is an intervention to cultivate conflict-proof well-being. Here, compassion practice refers to a form of concentrated meditation wherein a practitioner attunes to friend, enemy, and someone in between, thinking, “I’m going to help them (equally).” The compassion meditation is based on Buddhist philosophy that mental suffering is rooted in conceptual thoughts that give rise to generic mental images of self and others and subsequent biases to preserve one’s egoism, blocking the ultimate nature of mind. To contextualize compassion meditation scientifically, we adopted a Bayesian active inference framework to incorporate relevant Buddhist concepts, including mind (buddhi), compassion (karuna), aggregates (skandhas), suffering (duhkha), reification (samaropa), conceptual thoughts (vikalpa), and superimposition (prapañca). In this framework, a person is considered a Bayesian Engine that actively constructs phenomena based on the aggregates of forms, sensations, discriminations, actions, and consciousness. When the person embodies rigid beliefs about self and others’ identities (identity-grasping beliefs) and the resulting ego-preserving bias, the person’s Bayesian Engine malfunctions, failing to use prediction errors to update prior beliefs. To counter this problem, after recognizing the causes of sufferings, a practitioner of the compassion meditation aims to attune to all others equally, friends and enemies alike, suspend identity-based conceptual thoughts, and eventually let go of any identity-grasping belief and ego-preserving bias that obscure reality. We present a brain model for the Bayesian Engine of three components: (a) Relation-Modeling, (b) Reality-Checking, and (c) Conflict-Alarming, which are subserved by (a) the Default-Mode Network (DMN), (b) Frontoparietal Network (FPN) and Ventral Attention Network (VAN), and (c) Salience Network (SN), respectively. Upon perceiving conflicts, the strengthening or weakening of ego-preserving bias will critically depend on whether the SN up-regulates the DMN or FPN/VAN, respectively. We propose that compassion meditation can strengthen brain regions that are conducive for suspending prior beliefs and enhancing the attunements to the counterparts in conflicts.

Does Synchronicity Point Us Toward the Fundamental Nature of Consciousness? An Exploration of Psychology, Ontology, and Research Prospects

The topic of synchronicity has long intrigued philosophers, scientists and the general public. Carl Jung formally introduced the term “synchronicity” in the 1950s, however to date very little empirical research has explored the underlying mechanisms of synchronicity. In other words, why do synchronicities occur? Are synchronicities random, or do they hold clues about the ultimate nature of reality? Drawing on theoretical and empirical research, the current paper explores the idea that synchronicity might be one way that the fundamental (i.e., ontologically primary) nature of consciousness reveals itself to us in everyday life, and that contemplative practices such as meditation might be capable of invoking synchronicity. In addition, while several useful theoretical overviews of synchronicity exist, there are very few peer-reviewed academic articles on synchronicity, and even fewer empirical research studies. Therefore a further purpose of this paper is to summarize theoretical perspectives on synchronicity in an attempt to spark a renewed interest in conducting empirical research on this topic. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that consciousness might represent the underlying nature of reality, that contemplative practices might give humans access to this fundamental consciousness, and that synchronicity might be one way that this fundamental consciousness reveals itself to us in everyday life.

Aristotle and Huxley: On happiness

According to Aristotle, one of the necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for a good and happy life is the possession of virtue. A person who possesses virtues never wants something that is bad, but only what is good, and in that way she is free from internal struggle. Such person is formed through good habits. In Huxley?s dystopia, individuals are shaped by genetic selection and behavioral conditioning to want only what is good for the state, its peace and prosperity, and thus to want what is good for themselves. The goal of this paper is to examine the differences between Aristotle and Huxley. In the first part of the paper I will discuss different techniques of character formation in Aristotle and those described in Huxley?s dystopia. In the second part of the paper, I will address the question why Huxley?s world does not appeal to us, even though everyone in it wants exactly what they should want. In the Brave new world Huxley portrays the world that is built around the assumption that for a person to be happy it is enough that they want what they can achieve and get. For Aristotle this is not enough. In addition to it we need to study the ultimate nature of the world. That Aristotle?s position is more likely to be the case is indicated by contemporary research in psychology.