Recently philosophers have debated which theory best captures the ordinary concept of weakness of will. Some claim that weakness of will consists in action contrary to an agent's better judgments, while others claim it consists of action contrary to an agent’s intentions. In this paper, we show that the psychological focus on violated commitments — whether judgments, intentions, or both — is too narrow. We begin by showing that many people attribute weakness of will even in the absence of a violated commitment (Experiment 1). We then show that weakness of will attributions are sensitive to two important non-psychological factors. First, for actions stereotypically associated with weakness of will, the absence of certain commitments often triggers weakness of will attributions (Experiments 2-4). Second, and in line with other recent findings, the quality of an action’s outcome affects the extent to which an agent is viewed as weak-willed. More specifically, actions with bad consequences are more likely to be viewed as weak-willed (Experiment 5). So the ordinary concept of weakness of will is sensitive to two non-psychological factors and is thus broader than previous philosophical accounts have recognized. To explain our findings, we propose a two-tier model of weakness of will as a failure of self-control.
Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences
