Learning Free Will, Self-Control, and Philosophy

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-36
Author(s):  
Peter B. Raabe
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalina Kopetz ◽  
Wilhelm Hofmann ◽  
Reinout W. H. J. Wiers

AbstractThe selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in peoples' goal pursuits without invoking free will, self-regulatory, or self-control failures. However, people pursue multiple goals, sometimes simultaneously. We argue that the model proposed in the target article may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles underlying goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to-moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Wertenbroch ◽  
Joachim Vosgerau ◽  
Sabrina Bruyneel
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 575-580
Author(s):  
Snezhana Yorgova ◽  

A person forms as a personality in the process of his/her social life: during one’s school life, work, communication with people. During studying, training and especially during Physical Education and Sports classes, students undergo a big physical and emotional stress: quickly changing conditions, the ability to obey common rules and requirements, respect towards others contribute to the development of such personal features as strong will, self-control, self-confidence, endurance, discipline.


2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Adrienne Wente ◽  
Xin Zhao ◽  
Alison Gopnik ◽  
Carissa Kang ◽  
Tamar Kushnir

Self-control is quite difficult—sometimes people are successful, but frequently they are not. So why do people believe that they can choose, by their own free will, to exercise self-control? This chapter summarizes recent research exploring the cultural and developmental origins of beliefs about self-control and free will. It discusses how two factors contribute to the development of children’s beliefs about self-control: culture and first-person experiences. The authors’ studies of four- to eight-year-old children (N = 441; mean age = 5.96 years; range = 3.92–8.90 years) from China, Singapore, Peru, and the United States indicate that self-control beliefs differ across cultures, and that, comparatively, US children hold intuitions that they can freely choose to exercise self-control. Additionally, evidence indicates that the experience of self-control failure impacts beliefs about free will in US children, but that these experience effects are not culturally universal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1112) ◽  
pp. 354-356
Author(s):  
Philip D Welsby

Human brains have about 100 billion neurons each with about 1000 dendritic connections with other neurons giving a total of 100 000 billion deterministic dendritic switches. Various voting systems that the brain may use can produce conflicting results from identical inputs without any indication as to which one or ones would be correct. Voting systems cannot deliver unequivocal results in any other than the simplest situations. It is hypothesised that these conflicting results provide an indeterminacy that underlies free will, self-awareness, awareness of others, consciousness and personal responsibility, all of which can influence doctor-patient interactions.


Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 191 (16) ◽  
pp. 3935-3954 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Doucet ◽  
John Turri

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-141
Author(s):  
James A. Schirillo

AbstractRachlin overlooks that free will determines when and in what direction acts that appear impulsive will occur. Because behavioral patterns continuously evolve, animals are not guaranteed when they will, or how to, maximize larger-later reinforcements. An animal therefore uses self-control to emit free acts to vary behavioral patterns to optimize larger-later rewards.


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