What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Huebner ◽  
Michael Bruno ◽  
Hagop Sarkissian
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal States

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

Sexual Desire and the Phenomenology of Attraction

Dialogue ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-283
Author(s):  
BRADLEY RICHARDS
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Arousal ◽  
Sexual Desire ◽  
Sexual Attraction ◽  
Sexual Activities ◽  
Sexual Desires ◽  
Affect States ◽  
Phenomenal States

Developing Thomas Nagel’s 1969 paper, Rockney Jacobsen argues that sexual desires are for activities that are taken to affect states of sexual arousal in certain ways. I argue that some sexual desires are for activities that are taken to affect states of phenomenal attraction (phenomenal states associated with sexual attraction). Unlike sexual arousal, phenomenal attraction cannot be assuaged; thus, there are no activities that can satisfy phenomenal attraction-based sexual desires. This explains why sexual activities are so varied and numerous, and possibly how so many activities are able to affect sexual arousal.

Phenomenal, access and reflexive consciousness

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-158
Author(s):  
Bill Faw
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
Cognitive Behavioral ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Phenomenal States

This paper adds five “blocks” (cells) to Ned Block’s 2-by-2 P- and A-Consciousness typology, by converting “phenomenal” and “access” into two orthogonal dimensions of Primary Conscious, and by introducing gradations along each dimension, with P0 (no phenomenal experience), P1 (attenuated phenomenal experience), and P2 (full phenomenal experience); and A0 (no access of mental content to either involuntary or voluntary cognitive/behavioral responses), A1 (access of mental content to involuntary responses), and A2 (access of mental content also to voluntary responses). This leads to a 3x3, 9-block grid, with Phenomenality on the X-axis and Access on the Y-axis. Each combination of P and A is examined for known conscious states. It is concluded that there are no known phenomenal states without at least A1 or A2 access. Neither are there states with A2 access without P2 phenomenality. At the end of the paper, Block’s concept of Reflexive Consciousness is introduced tantalizingly as a third (Z) dimension for consciousness in humans.

Certainty and Phenomenal States

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-72
Author(s):  
Steven D. Hales
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Inner Experience ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
History Of ◽  
Phenomenal States

The sort of knowledge we have with regard to the nature and kind of our own phenomenal states has enjoyed considerable prestige in the history of philosophy. Hume claims that ‘The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions’ (A Treatise of Human Nature, I 4.2). In the New Essays (II 27.238), Leibniz remarks that ‘if the immediate inner experience is not certain, we cannot be sure of any truth of fact.’

The Function of Phenomenal States: Is there Progress for the “Softer Problem” of Consciousness?

2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Morsella
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Task Demands ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Simple Method ◽  
Unconscious Processes ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Phenomenal States

The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states—the “hard problem” of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.

Phenomenal States

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Loar
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal States

scholarly journals Perceptual capacities, discrimination, and the senses

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Hornett
Keyword(s):  
Close Relation ◽  
Coarse Grained ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Phenomenal States

AbstractIn this paper, I defend a new theory of the nature and individuation of perceptual capacities. I argue that we need a theory of perceptual capacities to explain modal facts about what sorts of perceptual phenomenal states one can be in. I defend my view by arguing for three adequacy constraints on a theory of perceptual capacities: perceptual capacities must be individuated at least partly in terms of their place in a hierarchy of capacities, where these capacities include the senses themselves; an adequate account of perceptual capacities must be sensitive to empirical considerations; and an adequate account should accommodate the nature of the capacity to perceive. I arrive at these constraints by considering how Schellenberg’s view fails, before defending and developing my alternative in line with the constraints. I defend a view on which there are few, coarse-grained perceptual capacities which can fulfil complex explanatory roles because they are evaluatively gradable on many axes. Finally, on my view, perceptual capacities bear a particularly close relation to the sensory modalities themselves.

Pre-Reflective vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 298-315
Author(s):  
Terry Horgan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Presentation ◽  
Phenomenal States ◽  
Important Kind

In this paper I propose an account pre-reflective self-awareness, both vis-à-vis onself and vis-à-vis one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states and processes. I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness is a form of acquaintance with oneself and with one’s phenomenal states that is distinctively direct in this sense: it is not mediated by mental representations of those states or of oneself. I also argue that there is an important kind of reflective self-awareness that is reflexive, in this sense: it involves mental representations of one’s phenomenally conscious states, and of oneself, in which pre-reflective self-awareness plays a distinctive contributory role—a role I call ‘direct self-presentation’.

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