Theory of Mind and the Agreeableness-Antagonism Dimension: Differential Associations with Callousness, Aggression, and Manipulativeness

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to how we identify and understand the mental states of others. ToM abilities vary with dimensions of normal-range personality and can be seriously impaired in a number of mental disorders, particularly those related to the Antagonism domain. The current study used a multi-task design to examine how ToM relates to Agreeableness-Antagonism subfactors, replicating and extending previous work. Participants (N = 335) completed self-report measures of the Big Five, empathy, and personality pathology, as well as tasks spanning mental state attribution, affect recognition, and mentalizing. Exploratory structural equation modeling was used to assess the impact of Agreeableness-Antagonism subfactors on ToM. A three-factor structure was derived for Agreeableness-Antagonism, with factors corresponding to Compassion-Callousness, Pacifism-Aggression, and Honesty-Manipulativeness. While higher Aggression and lower Compassion predicted worse ToM ability, higher Manipulativeness predicted better ToM ability. Findings replicate and extend work suggesting differential relations of specific Agreeableness-Antagonism subfactors with social cognition. We discuss our results with a focus on the importance of dimensional psychopathology models and facet-level research.

Kinematics and observer-animator kinematic similarity predict mental state attribution from Heider–Simmel style animations

The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. Animations tasks, in which observers watch videos of interacting triangles, have been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations. Compared to control participants, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism typically offer less appropriate mental state descriptions of such videos. Recent research suggests that stimulus kinematics and movement similarity (between the video and the observer) may contribute to mental state attribution difficulties. Here we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we confirmed the hypotheses that an animation’s jerk and jerk similarity between observer and animator significantly contribute to the correct identification of an animation. By employing random forest analysis to explore other stimulus characteristics, we reveal that other indices of movement similarity, including acceleration- and rotation-based similarity, also predict performance. Our results highlight the importance of movement similarity between observer and animator and raise new questions about reasons why some clinical populations exhibit difficulties with this task.

Contextual perception under active inference

Human social interactions depend on the ability to resolve uncertainty about the mental states of others. The context in which social interactions take place is crucial for mental state attribution as sensory inputs may be perceived differently depending on the context. In this paper, we introduce a mental state attribution task where a target-face with either an ambiguous or an unambiguous emotion is embedded in different social contexts. The social context is determined by the emotions conveyed by other faces in the scene. This task involves mental state attribution to a target-face (either happy or sad) depending on the social context. Using active inference models, we provide a proof of concept that an agent’s perception of sensory stimuli may be altered by social context. We show with simulations that context congruency and facial expression coherency improve behavioural performance in terms of decision times. Furthermore, we show through simulations that the abnormal viewing strategies employed by patients with schizophrenia may be due to (i) an imbalance between the precisions of local and global features in the scene and (ii) a failure to modulate the sensory precision to contextualise emotions.

Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates

Social life demands complex strategies for coordinating and competing with others. In humans, these strategies are supported by rich cognitive mechanisms, such as theory of mind. Theory of mind (i.e., mental state attribution, mentalizing, or mindreading) is the ability to track the unobservable mental states, like desires and beliefs, that guide others’ actions. Deeply social animals, like most nonhuman primates, would surely benefit from the adept capacity to interpret and predict others’ behavior that theory of mind affords. Yet, after forty years of investigation, the extent to which nonhuman primates represent the minds of others remains a topic of contentious debate. In the present chapter, we review evidence consistent with the possibility that monkeys and apes are capable of inferring others’ goals, perceptions, and beliefs. We then evaluate the quality of that evidence and point to the most prominent alternative explanations to be addressed by future research. Finally, we take a more broadly phylogenetic perspective, to identify evolutionary modifications to social cognition that have emerged throughout primate evolutionary history and to consider the selective pressures that may have driven those modifications. Taken together, this approach sheds light on the complex mechanisms that define the social minds of humans and other primates.

Development and validation of the Mental-Physical Verb Norms (MPVN): A Text Analysis Measure of Mental State Attribution

Attribution of mental states to self and others, i.e., mentalizing, is central to human life. Current measures are lacking in ability to directly gauge the extent of individuals engage in spontaneous mentalizing. Focusing on natural language use as an expression of inner psychological processes, we developed the Mental-Physical Verb Norms (MPVN). These norms are participant-derived ratings of the extent to which common verbs reflect mental (opposite physical) activities and occurrences, covering ~80% of all verbs appearing within a given English text. Content validity was assessed against existing expert-compiled dictionaries of mental states and cognitive processes, as well as against normative ratings of verb concreteness. Criterion Validity was assessed through natural text analysis of internet comments relating to mental health vs. physical health. Results showcase the unique contribution of the MPVN ratings as a measure of the degree to which individuals adopt the intentional stance in describing targets, by describing both self and others in mental, opposite physical terms. We discuss potential uses for future research across various psychological and neurocognitive disciplines.

Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.

Attributing Minds to Triangles: Kinematics and Observer-Animator Kinematic Similarity predict Mental State Attribution in the Animations Task

The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. One task that has been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations is the animations task, where participants are asked to infer mental states from short videos of interacting triangles. In this task, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorders typically offer fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions than controls, however little is currently known about why they show these difficulties. Previous studies have hinted at the similarity between an observer’s and the triangles’ movements as a key factor for the successful interpretation of these animations. In this study we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we demonstrate that an animation’s kinematics and kinematic similarity between observer and generator are integral for the correct identification of that animation. Our results shed light on why some clinical populations show difficulties in this task and highlight the role of participants’ own movement and specific perceptual properties of the stimuli.