On the dynamic duopoly model of non-price competition

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 923-938
Author(s):  
Virtue U. Ekhosuehi ◽  
Augustine A. Osagiede
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

scholarly journals Duopoly price competition with limited capacity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Limited Capacity ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Full Capacity ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Given

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.

A Dynamic Duopoly Game with Content Providers’ Bounded Rationality

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (07) ◽  
pp. 2050095 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mostafa Jourhmane
Keyword(s):  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two content providers (CPs). Competition between two CPs is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and the credibility of content they offer. According to the CPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both CPs are bounded rational. Each CP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamical system induced by bounded rationality, and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Duopoly Model: When a Firm Shares the Market with Certain Profit

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1826
Author(s):  
Sameh S. Askar
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
Analytical Investigation ◽  
Basins Of Attraction ◽  
Stability Conditions ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Dynamic Duopoly

The current paper analyzes a competition of the Cournot duopoly game whose players (firms) are heterogeneous in a market with isoelastic demand functions and linear costs. The first firm adopts a rationally-based gradient mechanism while the second one chooses to share the market with certain profit in order to update its production. It trades off between profit and market share maximization. The equilibrium point of the proposed game is calculated and its stability conditions are investigated. Our studies show that the equilibrium point becomes unstable through period doubling and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. Furthermore, the map describing the proposed game is nonlinear and noninvertible which lead to several stable attractors. As in literature, we have provided an analytical investigation of the map’s basins of attraction that includes lobes regions.

Split Equilibrium Problems for Related Games and Applications to Economic Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850005
Author(s):  
Jinlu Li
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Banach Spaces ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Equilibrium Problems ◽  
Existence Of Solutions ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
Kkm Theorem ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Convex Subsets

In this paper we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems associated with two related noncooperative strategic games. Then we apply the Fan–KKM theorem to prove the existence of solutions to split Nash equilibrium problems of related noncooperative strategic games, in which the strategy sets of the players are nonempty closed and convex subsets in Banach spaces. As an application of this existence to economics, an example is provided that studies the existence of split Nash equilibrium of utilities of two related economies. As applications, we study the existence of split Nash equilibrium in the dual (playing twice) extended Bertrand duopoly model of price competition.

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