scholarly journals Identifying discrete behavioural types: a re-analysis of public goods game contributions by hierarchical clustering

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Fallucchi ◽  
R. Andrew Luccasen ◽  
Theodore L. Turocy
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Hierarchical Clustering ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Behavioural Types

Behavioural Types in Public Goods Games: A Re-Analysis by Hierarchical Clustering

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Fallucchi ◽  
R. Andrew Luccasen, III ◽  
Theodore Turocy
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Hierarchical Clustering ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Behavioural Types

The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay

2021 ◽  
Vol 394 ◽  
pp. 125835
Author(s):  
Junjun Zheng ◽  
Tianyu Ren ◽  
Gang Ma ◽  
Jinhui Dong
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Ability To Pay

A novel bilateral protocol in the bipartite network based on the public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 106721
Author(s):  
Linghui Guo ◽  
Zhongxin Liu ◽  
Zengqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Bipartite Network ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public

Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 126292
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Wenshu Xu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Jialu He
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Selection ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Emergence of cooperation with reputation-updating timescale in spatial public goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 393 ◽  
pp. 127173
Author(s):  
Weiwei Han ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Junqing Sun ◽  
Chengyi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation
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