The Economic Tradition and the Problem of Social Order: Hans Albert’s Critique of Welfare Economics and the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy

scholarly journals The rule of rules

Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hamlin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Rule Based

AbstractRules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

Evolving Preferences and Welfare Economics: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy

2014 ◽  
Vol 234 (2-3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Economics ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind

SummaryThe theoretical consistency and practical applicability of traditional welfare economics has long been subject to controversy. More recently the challenge has been added from evolutionary approaches that the individual preferences on which the welfare calculus is based are themselves subject to change. The purpose of the present paper is twofold. It takes, firstly, a closer look at the discussion on the need and feasibility of an evolutionary welfare economics that accommodates evolving preferences. The particular focus is on proposals advanced by three authors, Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, Ulrich Witt and Robert Sugden. And it seeks, secondly, to show that the paradigm of constitutional economics can deal with the evolving-preferences-issue in a more coherent and consistent way than approaches that remain within the mind-frame of welfare economics.

scholarly journals Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIKTOR J. VANBERG
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Consumer Sovereignty ◽  
Voluntary Exchange ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The paper approaches the ‘market versus state’ issue from the perspective of constitutional political economy, a research program that has been advanced as a principal alternative to traditional welfare economics and its perspective on the relation between market and state. Constitutional political economy looks at market and state as different kinds of social arenas in which people may realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange and cooperation. The working properties of these arenas depend on their respective constitutions, i.e. the rules of the game that define the constraints under which individuals are allowed, in either arena, to pursue their interests. It is argued that ‘improving’ markets means to adopt and to maintain an economic constitution that enhances consumer sovereignty, and that ‘improvement’ in the political arena means to adopt and to maintain constitutional rules that enhance citizen sovereignty.

The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Private Goods

This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962–4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992–4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.

The Institutional Foundations of Religious Freedom

2021 ◽  
pp. 2050006
Author(s):  
Mark Koyama
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
General Rules ◽  
The Reformation ◽  
Institutional Foundations

How did religious freedom emerge? I address this question by building on the framework of Johnson and Koyama’s Persecution & Toleration: The Long Road to Religious Freedom (2019). First, I establish that premodern societies, reliant on identity rules, were incapable of liberalism and religious freedom. Identity rules and restrictions on religious freedom were part of a political-economy equilibrium that ensured social order. Second, I examine developments like the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution, as shocks to this premodern identity rules and conditional toleration equilibrium. Finally, I consider several examples that support the claim that the move from identity rules to general rules allowed religious freedom to flourish.

Volksabstimmungen, Verhandlungen und der Schleier der Insignifikanz

1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baurmann ◽  
Hartmut Kliemt
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
The Veil

AbstractTo combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil of insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior.

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