A MODEL OF ISLAMIC PUBLIC FINANCE IN MALAYSIA’S CONSTITUTION

This study asks five questions. How does the Constitution define the framework for its governance and the principles under which it must operate? How do the provisions lay out the core public finance matters? How are Islamic religious defined? How could we interpret the provisions in the Constitution? How do Islamic religious revenues affect socioeconomic development? Based on the analysis of these questions, and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, this study will try to explain the choice of alternative sets of legal-institutional-constitutional rules that constrain the choices and activities of economic and political agents (government). In particular, this study will prove that the Constitution results from both conventional and Islamic scholars' preferences. The constitutional rules lead to the introduction of Islamic religious revenues as the sources of government revenues. Furthermore, in Malaysia, constitutional economics also provides another view that treats Islamic religious revenues as socioeconomic development tools.

The logical foundations of constitutional democracy between legal positivism and natural law theory

Rejecting all knowledge claims concerning right and wrong in matters practical James Buchanan concurred with legal positivism that invalid law cannot be identified by its substantive content but only by an inherited defect in its factual creation. Beyond correct creation Buchanan proposed as a quasi-natural law constraint that unanimity in the shadow of individual veto power must at least be conceivable if a norm is to be law. The emerging hybrid conception of constitutional law is symptomatic for Buchanan’s never-ending but ultimately futile efforts to incorporate Kantian ideals of interpersonal respect into constitutional economics without imposing them as personal values.

Influence of Business on State Policy within the Framework of Constitutional Economics

Nowadays, one of the key issues is the problem of interaction between the state and non-state actors in the context of constitutional economics. The 2020 Coronacrisis has not only revealed the need for a more in-depth analysis of the whole spectrum of this problem – conflict and overlap of interests, competition and partnership of the parties – but also raised the importance of the scientific debate to a new level. The purpose of this article is to study the importance of how enterprises can influence a government’s economic policy, including the limits of state interference in the implementation of its current activities in the light of the fundamental constitutional and legal provisions. The role of entrepreneurship and the influence that non-state economic actors exert on the economic policy of the state is increasing in contemporary conditions. The creation of a mutually beneficial format of interaction between the state and business, which is necessary to maintain the competitiveness of both, necessitates a rethinking of the basic constitutional principles upon which the economic model of the state is based. Under such circumstances, constitutional economics acts not only as a scientific study of existing models, but also assumes the important mission of implementing the objectively formed request to review the basic constitutional economic principles, which were established almost 100 years ago and do not always correspond to the current reality and challenges.

Social Entrepreneurship: The Concept, Attributes, Prospect

The article poses the problem of social entrepreneurship as a new phenomenon of economic and legal life for Russia. The author reveals the universal features of social entrepreneurship, gives a technical and legal characteristic of its legal definition, and also offers a working definition of social entrepreneurship in the perspective of interdisciplinary study based on the theory of entrepreneurship, institutional economics, constitutional economics, theory and practice of private law.

The constitutional economics of the World Health Organization

This paper brings a constitutional economics perspective to bear on the World Health Organization (WHO), the flagship United Nations intergovernmental health organisation, which is obligated by its Constitution to achieve ‘the highest possible level of health’ for the world's peoples. The WHO has in the seven decades of its existence used its formidable legislative powers only sparingly. It has been widely chided for being weak in regional coordination and unresponsive to transnational emergencies like the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016. In 2020, it found itself at the centre of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the middle of the Sino-American geopolitical tug-of-war. This paper traces the discordance between the Constitution's stated purposes and the actual track record of the WHO not back to its organisational culture nor to weak leadership but to the design of the Constitution itself. It analytically distinguishes the Constitution's expressive from its instrumental halves, and shows that, whilst the former embodies a ‘constitutional moment’ of international health solidarity right after the Second World War, the latter embodies a reserved and limited delegation from member-states that are jealous of their sovereignty.

Constitutional Economics under an Official Thought to be Divinely Guided: Implication on Islamic Republic of Iran

Constitutional economics is an interdisciplinary subject of constitutionalism and economics where political government tries to constitutionalize the economic activities within the state. Although, every political government tries to deal with all the economic aspects during constitutional engineering but, in theocratic states, the supreme religious institution performs the respective task because of having an official thought to be divinely guided. This study comprehensively describes the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih (introduced by the Imam Khomeni) in Iran, by which, the entire political system including the economic and financial affairs of Iran has become the subjects of Supreme Leader and his Guardian Council. Similarly, articles 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 31 of the Iranian constitution emphasize upon economic rights of the nation in general. On the other hand, articles 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of the constitution define Iranian economic infrastructure, which is comprised of state, corporate and private sectors.At the same time, articles from 100 to 106 of the constitution focus on the power and authorities of“the councils” at the town, city, district and provincial levels. Moreover,this study also provides constitutional economic analysis of article 05, articles 107 to 112, article 150,and article 176 that exhibits hegemony of Supreme Leader (in consultation with Guardian Council and Revolutionary Guards)regarding looking after, controlling and directing all the economic activities within the state. Furthermore, the study also investigates how and why each constitutional provision is the subject of the post of Supreme Leader (also called Vilayat-e-Faqīh; considered to be divinely guided).