The Frame Problem in the Situation Calculus: A Simple Solution (Sometimes) and a Completeness Result for Goal Regression

The purpose of this article is to extend the situation calculus, a logical framework for the specification of theories of action and change, with actions that have a non-deterministic or uncertain nature. Our approach is based upon the idea that actions may have a deterministic component, and a probabilistic component. For example, the act of flipping a coin has a deterministic component (the actual coin toss) and an uncertain component (the outcome). We extend the language of the situation calculus in order to make explicit this distinction between these two action components. Furthermore, we provide means to reason about the outcomes of processes specified only in terms of deterministic action components (which we call behaviors). In particular, we show how one can compute the probability that some fluent will hold after specific behavior is realized. An important feature of our approach is that the syntactic and semantic structure of actions and situations is independent of the decomposition of actions into deterministic and uncertain components. Thus, we inherit solutions to the frame problem ramification problem, etc.

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Monotonic Solution of The Frame Problem in The Situation Calculus

Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning - Studies in Cognitive Systems ◽

10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_2 ◽

1990 ◽

pp. 23-67 ◽

Cited By ~ 47

Author(s):

Lenhart Schubert

Keyword(s):

Situation Calculus ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Monotonic Solution ◽

The Frame Problem

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The Nondeterministic Situation Calculus

10.24963/kr.2021/21 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Giuseppe De Giacomo ◽

Yves Lespérance

Keyword(s):

Situation Calculus ◽

Simple Extension ◽

Program Execution ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Atomic Actions ◽

High Level ◽

The Frame Problem ◽

Standard Situation ◽

Nondeterministic Actions

The standard situation calculus assumes that atomic actions are deterministic. But many domains involve nondeterministic actions, with problems such as fully observable nondeterministic (FOND) planning and high-level program execution requiring solutions. Various approaches have been proposed to accommodate nondeterminism on top of the standard situation calculus language, for instance by introducing nondeterministic programs as in Golog and ConGolog. But a key problem in these approaches is that they don’t clearly distinguish between choices that can be made by the agent and choices that are made by the environment, i.e., angelic vs. devilish nondeterminism. In this paper, we propose a simple extension to the standard situation calculus that accommodates nondeterministic actions and preserves Reiter’s solution to the frame problem and answering projection queries through regression. We also provide a formalization of FOND planning and show how ConGolog high-level program execution in nondeterministic domains can be defined.

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The Frame Problem in Ethics

Philosophical Discourses ◽

10.16926/pd.2020.02.04 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2 ◽

pp. 53-73

Author(s):

Sebastian Gałecki

Keyword(s):

Artificial Intelligence ◽

Moral Judgment ◽

First Principles ◽

Practical Reasoning ◽

Ethical Principles ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Classical Philosophy ◽

The Frame Problem ◽

The Invisible

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.

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What role do the emotions play in cognition?

Consciousness & Emotion ◽

10.1075/ce.4.1.06meg ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 81-100 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Jason L. Megill

Keyword(s):

Face Recognition ◽

Selective Attention ◽

Research Program ◽

Affective Computing ◽

Higher Order ◽

Brain Disorders ◽

Frame Problem ◽

Cognitive Theories ◽

The Frame Problem ◽

The Way

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.

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