2006 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Best ◽  
Charles W. Hodges ◽  
James A. Yoder

Author(s):  
Michael Sattinger

This paper analyzes the distribution of earnings as being generated by workers choosing among occupations on the basis of earnings maximization. A worker’s earnings then have characteristics of an order statistic. The extension to multiple occupations leads to the revision results from A.D. Roy’s two-occupation case. An additional occupation raises expected earnings while in general reducing earnings inequality. Asymptotic results from order statistics suggest that the process of occupational choice determines a limiting distribution of earnings independently of underlying distributions of occupational abilities.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David T. Doran

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="letter-spacing: -0.15pt;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Batang;">This paper empirically tests for methodological superiority in detecting divergent earnings (the difference between actual and expected earnings).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Divergent earnings are generated using Value Line forecasted and reported earnings data.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Two hundred random samples of 100 cases each are drawn.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>One hundred independent two sample tests are performed with 0%, 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10 % positive earnings introduced.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The two sample tests are performed using both parametric (t test), and nonparametric (Mann Whitney test) statistics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>They are performed on the &ldquo;divergent earnings&rdquo; data deflated by: 1) forecasted earnings , and 2) the market price of the stock.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The results indicate that the superior alternative is nonparametric statistical methods based upon ranks, and the deflator choice under these nonparametric methods is of little consequence.</span></span></span></p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (8) ◽  
pp. 2417-2443
Author(s):  
Neil Thakral ◽  
Linh T. Tô

This paper provides field evidence on how reference points adjust, a degree of freedom in reference-dependence models. Examining this in the context of cabdrivers’ daily labor-supply behavior, we ask how the within-day timing of earnings affects decisions. Drivers work less in response to higher accumulated income, with a strong effect for recent earnings that gradually diminishes for earlier earnings. We estimate a structural model in which drivers work toward a reference point that adjusts to deviations from expected earnings with a lag. This dynamic view of reference dependence reconciles conflicting “neoclassical” and “behavioral” interpretations of evidence on daily labor-supply decisions. (JEL J22, J31, L94)


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 110-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jung Ho Choi ◽  
Alon Kalay ◽  
Gil Sadka

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jade Wong ◽  
Andreas Ortmann
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo D'Augusta ◽  
Matthew D. DeAngelis

ABSTRACT We examine whether the relationship between managerial tone and earnings performance depends on the performance of the firm relative to earnings expectations. Using both annual changes in earnings and the difference between realized earnings and analyst consensus forecasts, we find evidence of “tone concavity” around earnings expectations. Specifically, the covariance between managerial tone and earnings performance is positive when earnings are below expectations, but negative when earnings meet or exceed expectations. We interpret our results to suggest that managers downplay positive changes in earnings to attenuate future growth expectations. We also find that tone concavity is significantly attenuated by managers' career concerns and accounting conservatism, but unrelated to litigation risk. Our results indicate that the effect of earnings performance on disclosure tone is complex and reflects managers' incentives to manage expectations.


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