The insider-outsider politics approach conjectures that moderate unions and centre-left parties safeguard the interests of insiders and neglect outsiders in labour market reforms. This article challenges this hypothesis. By comparing the positions taken by centre-left parties and moderate union confederations during labour market reforms in Portugal and Spain (1975–2019), it shows that while they may indeed protect insiders, they sometimes do the opposite. To explain this, the article argues that more attention must be paid to the configuration of left parties and confederations. In Portugal, where communist and radical left parties were strong, the centre-left was afraid of losing outsiders’ electoral support, and thus it did not follow a pro-insider strategy. This was reinforced by the fact that the centre-left had to face the opposition of a strong class-oriented confederation that was not willing to commit to two-tier reforms. This was not what happened in Spain. The centre-left, supported by a union confederation, undertook a two-tier reform in 1984 because there was a different configuration of left parties and confederations. Notwithstanding, this was not a stable equilibrium because this confederation changed its position over time when it realized the negative consequences of these reforms. Henceforth, their strategy became more pro-outsider.
A Sectoral Supply-Side Model to Assess the Impact of Labour Market Reforms in Malta
