scholarly journals Sovereign debt and the cost of migration: India 1990–1992

2004 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-134
Author(s):  
Ephraim Clark ◽  
Geeta Lakshmi
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Coe ◽  
M. Hashem Pesaran ◽  
Shaun P. Vahey

2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 906-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Sussman ◽  
Yishay Yafeh

We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690–1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets.


2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ephraim Alois Clark ◽  
Geeta Lakshmi
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Bastida ◽  
María-Dolores Guillamón ◽  
Bernardino Benito

This article analyses the factors that seem to play an important role in determining the cost of sovereign debt. Specifically, we evaluate to what extent transparency, the level of corruption, citizens’ trust in politicians and credit ratings affect interest rates. For that purpose, we create a transparency index matching the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/World Bank Budgeting Database items with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Best Practices for Budget Transparency sections. We also check our assumptions with the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index and with a non-linear transformation of our index. Furthermore, we use several control variables for a sample of 103 countries in the year 2008. Our results show that better fiscal transparency, political trust and credit ratings are connected with a lower cost of sovereign debt. Finally, as expected, higher corruption, budget deficits, current account deficits and unemployment make sovereign interest rates increase. Points for practitioners The key implications for professionals working in public management and administration are twofold. First, despite the criticism raised by credit ratings, it is clear that poorer ratings are connected with higher financing costs for governments. Therefore, governments should enhance those indicators that impact the credit rating of their sovereign debt. Second, governments should seek to be more transparent, since transparency reduces uncertainty about the degree of cheating, improves decision-making and therefore decreases the cost of debt. Transparency reduces information asymmetries between governments and financial markets, which, in turn, diminishes the spread requested by investors.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Bremer ◽  
Reto Bürgisser

In the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis, governments across the continent adopted austerity. Existing research claims that fiscally conservative citizens support such fiscal policies. However, this literature largely ignores that fiscal consolidation carries substantial trade-offs. In hard times, governments have to cut spending or raise taxes to reduce government debt. We account for these budgetary trade-offs by using a split-sample and conjoint survey experiment conducted in four European countries. The results show that fiscal consolidation is not a priority for citizens: When forced to make a choice, support for reducing debt at the cost of lower spending or higher taxes is much smaller than in an unconstrained setting. Revenue-based consolidations are especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidations are also contested. Moreover, the public has clear budgetary priorities: People do not favor lower debt and taxes, but they support more progressive taxes to pay for higher government spending.


Author(s):  
Soutonnoma Ouedraogo ◽  
David Scofield ◽  
Garrett C. Smith

Given the size of the global sovereign debt market is nearly as large as the entire international equity market, a thorough understanding of this market is useful to academics and practitioners alike. Sovereign bond markets allow nations to balance trade and fiscal policy, but a well-functioning domestic bond market and access to international investors are more complex than merely issuing sovereign debt. A nation’s credit rating affects both its economy in terms of domestic market stability as well as the economic stability of trade partners. Default and the restructuring of sovereign debt can trigger economic crisis. Moreover, the so-called sovereign ceiling has a real economic impact on domestic firms and can substantially affect access to credit as well as the cost of both debt and equity capital. The chapter also discusses the role of integration, effects of global macroeconomic risk factors, and diversification benefits.


Author(s):  
Martin Sandbu

This chapter examines the case of Ireland's sovereign debt crisis. It was six months after Greece had been subjected to the troika's tutelage in return for a vast bridge loan, and the eurozone had set up a rescue fund in case other euro states lost access to market funding. Dublin's deficit was on course to hit an incredible 31 per cent of GDP, most of it due to the cost of bailing out collapsing Irish banks. Rumours were rife that Ireland was about to become the first to apply to the new European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for financial aid, which would place Irish economic policy, too, under the troika's whip. But even with Dublin's borrowing costs soaring and International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials spotted in the capital, one frazzled government minister after another denied that a eurozone rescue was imminent.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073889422110249
Author(s):  
Colin Krainin ◽  
Kristopher W Ramsay ◽  
Bella Wang ◽  
Joseph J Ruggiero

The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of the power shift and fundamentals of the market for debt interact to determine when a preventive motive is more likely to lead to war. Two main results show that (1) less probable but more extreme power shifts are most dangerous and (2) unlike the direct effect of interest rates on the cost of war, higher interest on sovereign debt makes war more likely. We present evidence for the latter effect by extending Lemke’s (2003) study of preventive war for major-power dyads between 1816 and 1992.


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