Does the Cost of Government Borrowing Transmit Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings Downgrades Shocks to Credit Growth?

Author(s):  
Nombulelo Gumata ◽  
Eliphas Ndou
2016 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Bastida ◽  
María-Dolores Guillamón ◽  
Bernardino Benito

This article analyses the factors that seem to play an important role in determining the cost of sovereign debt. Specifically, we evaluate to what extent transparency, the level of corruption, citizens’ trust in politicians and credit ratings affect interest rates. For that purpose, we create a transparency index matching the 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/World Bank Budgeting Database items with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Best Practices for Budget Transparency sections. We also check our assumptions with the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index and with a non-linear transformation of our index. Furthermore, we use several control variables for a sample of 103 countries in the year 2008. Our results show that better fiscal transparency, political trust and credit ratings are connected with a lower cost of sovereign debt. Finally, as expected, higher corruption, budget deficits, current account deficits and unemployment make sovereign interest rates increase. Points for practitioners The key implications for professionals working in public management and administration are twofold. First, despite the criticism raised by credit ratings, it is clear that poorer ratings are connected with higher financing costs for governments. Therefore, governments should enhance those indicators that impact the credit rating of their sovereign debt. Second, governments should seek to be more transparent, since transparency reduces uncertainty about the degree of cheating, improves decision-making and therefore decreases the cost of debt. Transparency reduces information asymmetries between governments and financial markets, which, in turn, diminishes the spread requested by investors.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Rodgers Cornaggia ◽  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Changjiang (John) Wang

Author(s):  
Javaid Akhter ◽  
Deepak Tandon ◽  
Gaurav Kulshreshtha

As per the 15th progress report on adoption of the BASEL regulatory framework, published in October 2018 by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 26 member jurisdictions now have final rules in force for CCCB. In India, the final rules on CCCB came into force from 5th Feb, 2014; however, the buffer has not been activated by RBI till now as in its assessment, the Credit to GDP gap and other indicators currently do not warrant activation of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCCB). The Basel III regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, released in December 2010, had introduced the CCCB aimed at strengthening banks defense against the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities. The CCCB is a pre-emptive measure that requires banks to build-up capital gradually as imbalances in the credit market develop. The primary objective of CCCB is to avoid any banking industry stress resulting from wide fluctuations in the credit cycle using the credit-to-GDP gap. In doing so, it raises the cost of capital for banks resulting in moderation of credit demand as well as dissuasion of banks from participating in binge credit growth during the buildup phase itself. The authors have calculated the credit-to-GDP gap (which has been accepted as the main Indicator) for India using the available data and conclude that the buffer guide has historically worked as a reliable EWI in the Indian context. The authors have also concluded that while CCCB is an instrument to protect banks from the bust phase of the financial cycle, it is not an instrument to manage the financial cycle, even if it may potentially have a smoothing impact. An important implication of implementing CCCB using the credit-to-GDP gap as the main indicator for banks and EMEs is that it may hinder beneficial financial deepening, if it is used to actively manage the financial cycle. The authors recommend including the attribution of the Credit-to-GDP GAP w.r.t., the changes attributable to GDP growth, as well as attributable to changes in credit growth in the decision making process to activate CCCB.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ga-Young Jang ◽  
Hyoung-Goo Kang ◽  
Ju-Yeong Lee ◽  
Kyounghun Bae

This study analyzes the relationship between Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) scores and bond returns using the corporate bond data in Korea during the period of 2010 to 2015. We find that ESG scores include valuable information about the downside risk of firms. This effect is particularly salient for the firms with high information asymmetry such as small firms. Interestingly, of the three ESG criteria, only environmental scores show a significant impact on bond returns when interacted with the firm size, suggesting that high environmental scores lower the cost of debt financing for small firms. Finally, ESG is complementary to credit ratings in assessing credit quality as credit ratings cannot explain away ESG effects in predicting future bond returns. This result suggests that credit rating agencies should either integrate ESG scores into their current rating process or produce separate ESG scores which bond investors integrate with the existing credit ratings by themselves.


2004 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-134
Author(s):  
Ephraim Clark ◽  
Geeta Lakshmi
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Coe ◽  
M. Hashem Pesaran ◽  
Shaun P. Vahey

2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 906-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Sussman ◽  
Yishay Yafeh

We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690–1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets.


Author(s):  
Aline Darbellay

Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the leading credit rating agencies (CRAs) have faced an increasing level of legal and regulatory scrutiny in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU). This chapter sheds light on the promise and perils of sovereign credit ratings in the light of the European sovereign debt crisis. The leading CRAs have been blamed for providing investors with inaccurate credit ratings, facing inappropriate incentives and lack of oversight. This chapter addresses the evolving function performed by CRAs over the past century. Traditionally, CRAs are private market actors assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers and debt instruments. Since the first sovereign bond ratings assigned in 1918, the rating business has grown in size and importance. Sovereign ratings supposedly predict financial distress of governments. Their role has shifted over the last four decades. Although they have repeatedly been blamed for being poor predictors of sovereign debt crises, CRAs continue to play a key role in modern capital markets.


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