HANMRE - An authenticated encryption secure against side-channel attacks for nonce-misuse and lightweight approaches

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 106663
Author(s):  
Song Dat Phuc Tran ◽  
Byoungjin Seok ◽  
Changhoon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals TEDT, a Leakage-Resist AEAD Mode for High Physical Security Applications

2019 ◽  
pp. 256-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Berti ◽  
Chun Guo ◽  
Olivier Pereira ◽  
Thomas Peters ◽  
François-Xavier Standaert
Keyword(s):  
Energy Cost ◽  
Energy Efficient ◽  
Low Energy ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Security Applications ◽  
Leakage Resistance ◽  
Encryption And Decryption ◽  
Associated Data

We propose TEDT, a new Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) mode leveraging Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs). TEDT provides the following features: (i) It offers full leakage-resistance, that is, it limits the exploitability of physical leakages via side-channel attacks, even if these leakages happen during every message encryption and decryption operation. Moreover, the leakage integrity bound is asymptotically optimal in the multi-user setting. (ii) It offers nonce misuse-resilience, that is, the repetition of nonces does not impact the security of ciphertexts produced with fresh nonces. (iii) It can be implemented with a remarkably low energy cost when strong resistance to side-channel attacks is needed, supports online encryption and handles static and incremental associated data efficiently. Concretely, TEDT encourages so-called leveled implementations, in which two TBCs are implemented: the first one needs strong and energy demanding protections against side-channel attacks but is used in a limited way, while the other only requires weak and energy-efficient protections and performs the bulk of the computation. As a result, TEDT leads to more energy-efficient implementations compared to traditional AEAD schemes, whose side-channel security requires to uniformly protect every (T)BC execution.

scholarly journals Spook: Sponge-Based Leakage-Resistant Authenticated Encryption with a Masked Tweakable Block Cipher

2020 ◽  
pp. 295-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Bellizia ◽  
Francesco Berti ◽  
Olivier Bronchain ◽  
Gaëtan Cassiers ◽  
Sébastien Duval ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Block Size ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Mode Of Operation ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Tweakable Block Cipher ◽  
Software And Hardware

This paper defines Spook: a sponge-based authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm. It is primarily designed to provide security against side-channel attacks at a low energy cost. For this purpose, Spook is mixing a leakageresistant mode of operation with bitslice ciphers enabling efficient and low latency implementations. The leakage-resistant mode of operation leverages a re-keying function to prevent differential side-channel analysis, a duplex sponge construction to efficiently process the data, and a tag verification based on a Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) providing strong data integrity guarantees in the presence of leakages. The underlying bitslice ciphers are optimized for the masking countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Spook is an efficient single-pass algorithm. It ensures state-of-the-art black box security with several prominent features: (i) nonce misuse-resilience, (ii) beyond-birthday security with respect to the TBC block size, and (iii) multiuser security at minimum cost with a public tweak. Besides the specifications and design rationale, we provide first software and hardware implementation results of (unprotected) Spook which confirm the limited overheads that the use of two primitives sharing internal components imply. We also show that the integrity of Spook with leakage, so far analyzed with unbounded leakages for the duplex sponge and a strongly protected TBC modeled as leak-free, can be proven with a much weaker unpredictability assumption for the TBC. We finally discuss external cryptanalysis results and tweaks to improve both the security margins and efficiency of Spook.

scholarly journals Tightness of the Suffix Keyed Sponge Bound

2020 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Christoph Dobraunig ◽  
Bart Mennink
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Key Recovery ◽  
Security Proofs ◽  
Generic Attacks ◽  
Key Recovery Attacks ◽  
Security Bound

Generic attacks are a vital ingredient in the evaluation of the tightness of security proofs. In this paper, we evaluate the tightness of the suffix keyed sponge (SuKS) bound. As its name suggests, SuKS is a sponge-based construction that absorbs the key after absorbing the data, but before producing an output. This absorption of the key can be done via an easy to invert operation, like an XOR, or a hard to invert operation, like a PRF. Using SuKS with a hard to invert absorption provides benefits with respect to its resistance against side-channel attacks, and such a construction is used as part of the authenticated encryption scheme Isap. We derive two key recovery attacks against SuKS with easy to invert key absorption, and a forgery in case of hard to invert key absorption. The attacks closely match the terms in the PRF security bound of SuKS by Dobraunig and Mennink, ToSC 2019(4), and therewith show that these terms are justified, even if the function used to absorb the key is a PRF, and regardless of whether SuKS is used as a PRF or a MAC.

scholarly journals Retrofitting Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption to Microcontrollers

2020 ◽  
pp. 365-388
Author(s):  
Florian Unterstein ◽  
Marc Schink ◽  
Thomas Schamberger ◽  
Lars Tebelmann ◽  
Manuel Ilg ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Cryptographic Keys ◽  
Protection Mechanisms ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf ◽  
Iot Devices ◽  
Physical Access

The security of Internet of Things (IoT) devices relies on fundamental concepts such as cryptographically protected firmware updates. In this context attackers usually have physical access to a device and therefore side-channel attacks have to be considered. This makes the protection of required cryptographic keys and implementations challenging, especially for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microcontrollers that typically have no hardware countermeasures. In this work, we demonstrate how unprotected hardware AES engines of COTS microcontrollers can be efficiently protected against side-channel attacks by constructing a leakage resilient pseudo random function (LR-PRF). Using this side-channel protected building block, we implement a leakage resilient authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme that enables secured firmware updates. We use concepts from leakage resilience to retrofit side-channel protection on unprotected hardware AES engines by means of software-only modifications. The LR-PRF construction leverages frequent key changes and low data complexity together with key dependent noise from parallel hardware to protect against side-channel attacks. Contrary to most other protection mechanisms such as time-based hiding, no additional true randomness is required. Our concept relies on parallel S-boxes in the AES hardware implementation, a feature that is fortunately present in many microcontrollers as a measure to increase performance. In a case study, we implement the protected AEAD scheme for two popular ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers with differing parallelism. We evaluate the protection capabilities in realistic IoT attack scenarios, where non-invasive EM probes or power consumption measurements are employed by the attacker. We show that the concept provides the side-channel hardening that is required for the long-term security of IoT devices.

scholarly journals Towards Low-Energy Leakage-Resistant Authenticated Encryption from the Duplex Sponge Construction

2020 ◽  
pp. 6-42
Author(s):  
Chun Guo ◽  
Olivier Pereira ◽  
Thomas Peters ◽  
François-Xavier Standaert
Keyword(s):  
Low Energy ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Authenticated Encryption ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Leakage Resistance ◽  
Encryption And Decryption ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Energy Leakage ◽  
Standardization Process ◽  
Tweakable Block Cipher

The ongoing NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process highlights the importance of resistance to side-channel attacks, which has renewed the interest for Authenticated Encryption schemes (AEs) with light(er)-weight sidechannel secure implementations. To address this challenge, our first contribution is to investigate the leakage-resistance of a generic duplex-based stream cipher. When the capacity of the duplex is of c bits, we prove the classical bound, i.e., ≈ 2c/2, under an assumption of non-invertible leakage. Based on this, we propose a new 1-pass AE mode TETSponge, which carefully combines a tweakable block cipher that must have strong protections against side-channel attacks and is scarcely used, and a duplex-style permutation that only needs weak side-channel protections and is used to frugally process the message and associated data. It offers: (i) provable integrity (resp. confidentiality) guarantees in the presence of leakage during both encryption and decryption (resp. encryption only), (ii) some level of nonce misuse robustness. We conclude that TETSponge is an appealing option for the implementation of low-energy AE in settings where side-channel attacks are a concern. We also provides the first rigorous methodology for the leakage-resistance of sponge/duplex-based AEs based on a minimal non-invertibility assumption on leakages, which leads to various insights on designs and implementations.

Countermeasure for Cryptographic Chips to Resist Side-Channel Attacks

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 2990-2998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao ZHANG ◽  
Ming-Yu FAN
Keyword(s):  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals ThermalAttackNet: Are CNNs Making It Easy to Perform Temperature Side-Channel Attack in Mobile Edge Devices?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 146
Author(s):  
Somdip Dey ◽  
Amit Kumar Singh ◽  
Klaus McDonald-Maier
Keyword(s):  
Information Flow ◽  
Heat Dissipation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attack ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Information Flow Control ◽  
On Chip ◽  
Temperature Side ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Memory Efficient

Side-channel attacks remain a challenge to information flow control and security in mobile edge devices till this date. One such important security flaw could be exploited through temperature side-channel attacks, where heat dissipation and propagation from the processing cores are observed over time in order to deduce security flaws. In this paper, we study how computer vision-based convolutional neural networks (CNNs) could be used to exploit temperature (thermal) side-channel attack on different Linux governors in mobile edge device utilizing multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). We also designed a power- and memory-efficient CNN model that is capable of performing thermal side-channel attack on the MPSoC and can be used by industry practitioners and academics as a benchmark to design methodologies to secure against such an attack in MPSoC.

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