Effects of sustainability investment and risk aversion on a two-stage supply chain coordination under a carbon tax policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 106324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingguo Bai ◽  
Jianteng Xu ◽  
Satyaveer S. Chauhan
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jian Liu ◽  
Chao Hu

Carbon tax policy has been shown to be an effective incentive for the reduction of carbon emissions, and it also profoundly influences supply chain cooperation. This paper explores the interaction between carbon taxes and green supply chain cooperation. Specifically, we analyze the impact of a carbon tax on green supply chain coordination and further optimize the carbon tax to achieve a win-win situation for both the supply chain and the environment. Because consumer’s behavior has a significant impact on green product demand, we consider the problems above under two types of consumer’s behavior characteristics: consumer’s environmental awareness and consumer’s reference behavior. A game-theoretic model is employed to describe a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, combining important factors such as the carbon tax rate, green investment coefficient, and degree of reference effect. Then, we obtain the optimal carbon tax rate by balancing the total tax revenue and product greenness. A revenue-sharing contract is introduced to achieve green supply chain coordination, and the impact of the carbon tax on coordination is analyzed. The results show the following. (1) The carbon tax rate and the difference between the power of the manufacturer and retailer are the main factors determining green supply chain coordination. (2) Maximum greenness can be achieved when development costs are higher, while the maximum tax revenue is obtained when the development cost is lower, but with the loss of greenness. (3) If the power of the manufacturer is low, coordination can be achieved under the optimal carbon tax. If the power of the manufacturer is at a medium level, coordination can be achieved by increasing the carbon tax; as a result, increased greenness will be realized, but with the loss of tax revenue. However, when the power of the manufacturer is strong, coordination cannot be achieved. (4) Price reference behavior can promote supply chain coordination, but consumer’s environmental awareness cannot.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Jiaxin Shen ◽  
Xiaomei Li

Carbon tax is an emission regulation, which widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and optimal product prices. To address firms’ decision-making challenges, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under carbon tax policy; it establishes a Stackelberg game model with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer who is the leader of the game. The paper studies the influence of the government’s carbon tax policy and retailer’s risk-averse attitude on the optimal decision of the supply chain. The result shows that when the retailer is risk aversion, the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the manufacturer and unit carbon emission reduction, and within a certain range of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, it is positively correlated with the price of products; with the increase of the carbon tax rate imposed by the government, the retail price of unit products, the wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction of unit products also increase. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Sandhya Makkar

In the changing market scenario, supply chain management is getting phenomenal importance amongst researchers. Studies on supply chain management have emphasized the vitality of a long-term strategic relationship between the supplier, distributor and retailer. In this article, the authors have studied a two-stage supply chain coordination problem under uncertain costs and demand information when integrated procurement and distribution decisions of supply chain has to be employed. The model incorporates a single supplier transporting its products to multiple destinations of a retailer. This process becomes tedious, as when items have an inventory carrying cost incurred due to perishable nature of products. Different discount policies are offered to procure and transport goods from the one stage to other stage. Fuzzy set theory is applied to estimate the uncertainty associated with the input parameters and triangular fuzzy numbers are used to analyze the model. A case is presented to validate the procedure.


2013 ◽  
Vol 869-870 ◽  
pp. 840-843
Author(s):  
Xin Janet Ge

The Australian carbon pricing scheme (carbon tax) was introduced and became effective on 01 July 2012. The introduction of the carbon tax immediately increases the cost of electricity to a number of industries such as manufacturing and construction. Households were also affected as a result of these costs been passed through the supply chain of the affected industries. The carbon tax policy was introduced to addresses greenhouse emissions and energy consumption in Australia. However, the carbon tax policy may have introduced a number of economic risk factors to the Australian housing market, in particular the impact of housing affordability.


Author(s):  
Zhongyi Liu ◽  
Shengya Hua ◽  
Guanying Wang

We investigate vulnerable supply chain coordination with an option contract in the presence of supply chain disruption risk caused by external and internal disturbances. The supply chain consists of a single risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. We characterize the retailer’s order quantity decision under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion and the supplier’s production decision. The results show that facing disruption risk and risk-aversion, both the retailer and the supplier would be more prudent to order and produce less than the risk-neutral scenario, inducing damage to the supply chain performance. The number of options purchased is decreasing in disruption risk and the risk-aversion of the retailer. The supplier will increase production as the disruption risk decreases or the shortage penalty increases. When the supplier does not know the risk-aversion of the retailer, the former will produce more and bear a higher overstock risk. We also investigate conditions that facilitate vulnerable supply chain coordination and find that the existence of risk-aversion and disruption risk restrict the option price and exercise price to lower price levels. Finally, we compare the option contract with wholesale price contract from the supplier’s and retailer’s perspectives through a numerical study.


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