Back to basics: The European Court of Justice further defined the concept of personal data and the scope of the right of data subjects to access it

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-119
Author(s):  
Xavier Tracol
2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.


Author(s):  
Unai ABERASTURI GORRIÑO

LABURPENA: Norberaren datuak babesteko oinarrizko eskubidea etengabe berrikusten ari den ahalmena da. Berrikuspen honen nondik norakoa teknologia berrien garapenak baldintzatzen du. Azken urteetan asko azpimarratu da Interneten bilatzaile orokorrek eskubide honen gain sortzen dituzten arriskuak. Arrisku hauetariko bat da behin pertsona bati buruzko informazioa sarean jasota informazio hori epe luzerako geratuko dela Interneten eta bilatzaileen bitartez informazio hori beti jarriko dela harremanetan bere jabearekin. Bilatzaileek pertsona bat informazio batekin lotzera kondenatzen dute eta egitate horrek kalteak sor ditzake, batez ere aurkitzen diren datuen edukia negatiboa denean. Hain zuzen, bilatzaileek sor ditzaketen kalteak ekiditeko ≪Interneten ahaztua izateko eskubidea≫ aurrezagutu da. Eskubide honi buruz asko eztabaidatu da azken urteetan, batez ere Europar Batasuneko Justizi Auzitegiak bere existentzia onartu zuenetik. Hain zuzen, eskubide honen edukia aztertu nahi da lan honetan. RESUMEN: El derecho fundamental a la proteccion de datos de caracter personal constituye una facultad en constante revision. Esta revision se produce al albur de la continua evolucion de las nuevas tecnologias. En los ultimos anos se han subrayado de manera especial los riesgos que producen los buscadores que se utilizan en Internet para encontrar informacion. Entre estos riesgos cabe subrayar el hecho de que cuando una informacion se incluye en Internet esta queda a disposicion de los usuarios y el que a traves de los buscadores esa informacion se pondra en relacion constantemente con el titular de la misma. Los buscadores condenan a que una persona quede vinculada perpetuamente a una informacion y esta circunstancia puede producir graves perjuicios, sobre todo cuando el contenido de la informacion es negativo. Precisamente, para evitar estos perjuicios se reconoce el denominado derecho al olvido en Internet. Se ha discutido mucho en torno a este derecho, sobre todo a partir de que el Tribunal de Justicia de la Union Europea reconociera expresamente su existencia. Es el contenido de este derecho el que se va a analizar en este trabajo. ABSTRACT: The fundamental right to the personal data protection is a faculty in permanent revision. This revision is at the mercy of the continuous development of new technologies. Last years the risks produced by the search engines which are used to find information have especially been emphasized. Among the risks it can be emphasized the fact that when an information is included in internet it remains at the user’s disposal and that by means of the search engines that information will constantly put in relation with the holder of it. Search engines condemn a person to be perpetually linked to an information and that circumstance can produce serious harm, especially when the content of that information is negative. Exactly, in order to avoid those damages it is been acknowledged the right to forget in Internet, There has been a lot of discussion about this right, especially after the European Court of Justice recognized specifically its existence. The content of that right will be analyzed in this work.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 1025-1032
Author(s):  
Delphine De Mey

On 1 March 2005, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ECJ’ or ‘the Court’) got another opportunity to rule on the effect of recommendations and decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) in the Community legal order. The ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, before a national court, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB had previously declared the Community legislation to be incompatible with those rules.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chr. van Ooyen

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court intensified its judgements with regard to Europe and in its recent rulings on rescuing the euro and the electoral threshold in EU elections emphasised its belief in a form of democracy based on the idea that the nation and the state supersede everything else, a standpoint which it has adopted since the Treaty of Maastricht. With the right to be forgotten I and II, the First Senate has now also reacted to the European Court of Justice by suddenly committing itself to being the ‘guardian’ of European fundamental human rights and even threatening to revert to its old ‘European-friendly’ Solange II rulings. This book’s principal argument is that all this reveals the Europhobic nature of the German Constitutional Court’s state theory, which results from outdated traditions in the German doctrine of constitutional law and from a lack of democratic theory. The recent rulings on the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights from November 2019 are just some of new additions to the eighth edition of this book.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-185
Author(s):  
Charles Poncelet

Abstract The right of access to justice in environmental matters constitutes one of the three pillars enshrined by the Århus Convention to which the European Union is a Party. This article will examine a recent judgment of the European Court of Justice. Indeed, the latter appears to play an important role in the implementation of this procedural right.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 348-366
Author(s):  
Astrid Epiney ◽  
Benedikt Pirker

The present contribution assesses the case law of the European Court of Justice interpreting the provisions of the Aarhus Convention relating to access to justice. Cases have dealt with the temporal scope of application of provisions on access to justice, projects implemented by specific acts of national legislation and their exclusion from the obligations under the Convention, interim relief and the effet utile of provisions on access to justice, the range of possible pleas for judicial review, the role of procedural errors, permissible costs of proceedings, access to justice for environmental associations under different provisions of the Convention and the annulment of a permit and its relationship with the right to property. As is also shown, this case law is at the same time relevant – though not binding – for Switzerland as a non-eu Member State, but party to the Convention.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Barnard ◽  
Bob Hepple

THE preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice in the Seymour-Smith and Perez case about the scope and meaning of indirect discrimination has done little to clarify this perplexing concept. The ruling does not tell the thousands of short-service employees whose claims were stayed pending the litigation whether the qualifying period of two years’ continuous service for the right not to be unfairly dismissed is contrary to Community law. Nor does it provide clear standards by which disparate impact is to be tested, nor the relevant time for assessing the legality of an allegedly discriminatory measure, nor the conditions for establishing objective justification. More generally, these proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty reveal a failure by the Court to perform its function of facilitating the national court in interpreting and applying Community equality law in a way which would be consistent and uniform throughout the Union.


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