scholarly journals The role of experience in location estimation: Target distributions shift location memory biases

Cognition ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Lipinski ◽  
Vanessa R. Simmering ◽  
Jeffrey S. Johnson ◽  
John P. Spencer
Author(s):  
Ziqing Yao ◽  
Xuanyi Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu

Abstract When people are confronted with feedback that counters their prior beliefs, they preferentially rely on desirable rather than undesirable feedback in belief updating, i.e. an optimism bias. In two pre-registered EEG studies employing an adverse life event probability estimation task, we investigated the neurocognitive processes that support the formation and the change of optimism biases in immediate and 24 h delayed tests. We found that optimistic belief updating biases not only emerged immediately but also became significantly larger after 24 h, suggesting an active role of valence-dependent offline consolidation processes in the change of optimism biases. Participants also showed optimistic memory biases: they were less accurate in remembering undesirable than desirable feedback probabilities, with inferior memories of undesirable feedback associated with lower belief updating in the delayed test. Examining event-related brain potentials (ERPs) revealed that desirability of feedback biased initial encoding: desirable feedback elicited larger P300s than undesirable feedback, with larger P300 amplitudes predicting both higher belief updating and memory accuracies. These results suggest that desirability of feedback could bias both online and offline memory-related processes such as encoding and consolidation, with both processes contributing to the formation and change of optimism biases.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladislava Segen

The current study investigated a systematic bias in spatial memory in which people, following a perspective shift from encoding to recall, indicated the location of an object further to the direction of the shit. In Experiment 1, we documented this bias by asking participants to encode the position of an object in a virtual room and then indicate it from memory following a perspective shift induced by camera translation and rotation. In Experiment 2, we decoupled the influence of camera translations and camera rotations and examined also whether adding more information in the scene would reduce the bias. We also investigated the presence of age-related differences in the precision of object location estimates and the tendency to display the bias related to perspective shift. Overall, our results showed that camera translations led to greater systematic bias than camera rotations. Furthermore, the use of additional spatial information improved the precision with which object locations were estimated and reduced the bias associated with camera translation. Finally, we found that although older adults were as precise as younger participants when estimating object locations, they benefited less from additional spatial information and their responses were more biased in the direction of camera translations. We propose that accurate representation of camera translations requires more demanding mental computations than camera rotations, leading to greater uncertainty about the position of an object in memory. This uncertainty causes people to rely on an egocentric anchor thereby giving rise to the systematic bias in the direction of camera translation.


1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Fyock ◽  
Charles Stangor
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (10) ◽  
pp. 2048-2059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Madan ◽  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L. Spetch

People's risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically more risk averse for gains than for losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed the opposite pattern in experience. People also more readily remembered the extreme outcomes and judged them as having occurred more frequently. These memory biases correlated with risk preferences in decisions from experience but not in decisions from description. These results suggest that systematic memory biases may be responsible for some of the differences in risk preference across description and experience.


IBRO Reports ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. S210
Author(s):  
Jihye Lee ◽  
Hyopil Kim ◽  
Su-Eon Sim ◽  
Myung Won Kim ◽  
Jisu Lee ◽  
...  

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