Distributed control for polygeneration microgrids: A Dynamic Market Mechanism approach

2022 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 105052
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Nudell ◽  
Massimo Brignone ◽  
Michela Robba ◽  
Andrea Bonfiglio ◽  
Giulio Ferro ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Distributed Control ◽  
Market Mechanism

Perspectives and Regulation of the Russian Market for Project-based Transactions under the Kyoto Protocol

2008 ◽  
pp. 108-125
Author(s):  
K. Zavodov
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Russian Market ◽  
Increase Energy Efficiency ◽  
New Form ◽  
Contract Structure ◽  
Carbon Fund

Project-based transactions (PBTs) are a market mechanism of attracting foreign investments in order to abate greenhouse gas emissions and increase energy efficiency of the country’s enterprises. The article provides a classification and analyzes advantages and drawbacks of PBTs from the point of view of a host country. The main trends and factors determining the dynamics of the PBT market are described. Given that Russia currently lags behind the leaders of the PBT market, an incorporation of a state carbon fund is put forward with an aim of channelling PBTs through it. This paper proposes a form of PBT market regulation by incorporating an option mechanism into the contract structure of a transaction. A comparison of the new form of regulation with the tools that are currently in use in Russia and other countries demonstrates its greater economic efficiency under uncertainty.

Probabilistic Supply and Demand Balance Control Method based on Electricity Market Mechanism Considering N-1 Criterion

2021 ◽  
Vol 141 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Akira Koide ◽  
Takao Tsuji ◽  
Kazuyuki Tanaka ◽  
Hitoshi Sugimoto
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Balance Control ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Market Mechanism

Distributed Control for Linear Systems

1983 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Tse ◽  
C.Y. Chong ◽  
S. Mori
Keyword(s):  
Linear Systems ◽  
Distributed Control

Vertical Boilerplate

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Law School ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

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