Cross-border systemic risk spillovers in the global oil system: Does the oil trade pattern matter?

2021 ◽  
pp. 105395
Author(s):  
Bo Zhu ◽  
Jiahao Liu ◽  
Renda Lin ◽  
Julien Chevallier
Author(s):  
Claudia M. Buch ◽  
Gayle L. Delong

The financial crisis has renewed interest in the globalization of the banking industry, the patterns of entry into foreign markets, and the effects of complex banking organizations. There is a rich body of literature on international banks, which has recently been expanded by the improved theoretical modeling of the international banking firm and by focusing on implications for (systemic) risk. In this chapter, we focus on three main questions. First, what are the determinants of cross-border entry through acquisitions of commercial banks? Second, what are the effects of cross-border entry on complexity and the efficiency of banks? Third, what are the risk effects of international bank acquisitions, in particular with regard to systemic risk? We begin with a brief summary of the stylized facts, and we conclude with implications for researchers and policymakers.


Author(s):  
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega ◽  
Juan Solé

Generalized calls for more and higher quality capital for systemic institutions were the first natural reaction to the recent global financial crisis. Although the introduction of systemic risk-based capital surcharges is a proposal that has gained acceptance, its design still faces important challenges—including how to measure systemic risk, avoid the surcharges’ procyclicality, and cross-border coordination. This chapter contributes to the debate on the merits and operationalization of systemic risk-based capital surcharges by presenting two methodologies for computing surcharges based on an institution’s contribution to systemic risk. The chapter also illustrates ways to lessen their procyclicality. The authors conclude discussing practical cross-border, data, and communication issues for an effective implementation of systemic capital surcharges.


Author(s):  
Michael Schillig

Special resolution regimes are generally introduced with the objective of helping to ‘maintain financial stability, minimize systemic risk, protect consumers, limit moral hazard and promote market efficiency’. The recurring themes are financial stability, systemic risk, and taxpayers’ exposure to losses. This chapter explores whether and to what extent a special resolution regime for banks and financial institutions can contribute to the enhancement of financial (system) stability and can limit systemic risk. It seeks to clarify these concepts and discusses possible ex ante incentives that a (recovery and) resolution regime may provide for controlling systemic risk. Further, it focuses on ex post remedies for the curtailment of systemic risk, and considers the international and cross-border implications.


Author(s):  
George Andrew Karolyi ◽  
John Sedunov ◽  
Alvaro G. Taboada
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
pp. 170-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksandr MOMOT

Introduction. One of the manifestations of financial globalization is the formation and development of cross-border links of transnational banks. This expands opportunities for investment and contributes to the economic development of many countries. At the same time, the increasing complexity of financial ties strengthens the cross-border interdependence of transnational banks, leading to the transfer of financial shocks that arise in some countries to others. The purpose. The article aims to explore the role of multinational banks in the transmission of global systemic risk, identify existing problems supervision of multinational banks as globally systemically important financial institutions and identify solutions. Results. The article deals with the processes of transmission by transnational banks of global systemic risk in the framework of the “theory of infection of financial markets”. The influence of the “general creditor effect” on the spread of crisis phenomena between the economies of different countries is analyzed. The direction of influence of cross-border links of transnational banks on financial stability of the banking system of the country is clarified. Approaches to the identification of globally systemically important banks have been highlighted in accordance with international practice, and tasks have been identified to strengthen regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational banks. Conclusion. Today, regulators have limited ability to prevent the transmission of global systemic risk multinational banks. Many institutional mechanisms exist at national level and aimed at maintaining the financial stability of banking systems and crisis management of banks, there are no globally. However, only coordinated decisions on measures of overcoming the crisis can ensure effective implementation of anti-crisis programs globally


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