Approaching the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles with a general social welfare function

2021 ◽  
Vol 104 ◽  
pp. 104390
Author(s):  
Takeshi Ebina ◽  
Keita Kinjo
Author(s):  
Tripat Gill

AbstractThe ethical dilemma (ED) of whether autonomous vehicles (AVs) should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs.


Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow

Abstract Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.


Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler

This chapter describes and compares the two most important policy-analysis methodologies in economics: cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the social-welfare-function (SWF) framework. Both approaches are consequentialist and welfarist; both are typically combined with a preference-based view of well-being. Despite these similarities, the two methodologies differ in significant ways. CBA translates well-being impacts into monetary equivalents, and ranks outcomes according to the sum total of monetary equivalents. By contrast, the SWF framework relies upon an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being. Each possible outcome is mapped onto a list (vector) of these well-being numbers, one for each person in the population; the ranking of outcomes, then, is driven by some rule (the SWF) for ranking these well-being vectors. The utilitarian SWF and the prioritarian family of SWFs (each corresponding to well-developed positions in moral philosophy) are especially plausible. The case for using CBA rather than one of these SWFs is weak—or so the chapter argues.


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