scholarly journals Barriers to energy efficiency in shipping: A triangulated approach to investigate the principal agent problem

Energy Policy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 44-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nishatabbas Rehmatulla ◽  
Tristan Smith
REGION ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Hill

The aim of this paper is two-fold: 1) to examine the determinants of residential energy expenditures and compare them on a regional level; and, 2) attempt to identify and measure the effect of possible principal-agent (PA) problems on residential energy efficiency in Austria. The results of this paper are partially based on findings from a master’s thesis, which focused more directly on the PA problem. This paper expands on those results to include regional aspects in energy expenditures. A conditional demand model is regressed on a large number of variables representing housing characteristics, socio-economic factors, occupancy type, and regional characteristics sourced from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions dataset. The analysis indicates that significant regional differences exist in the determinants of residential energy expenditures and that PA problems appear to be unimportant to energy efficiency in Austria, even at the regional level. It concludes with some possible explanations as to why this is the case.


10.14311/1247 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Valentová

This paper assesses the main barriers that prevent economic energy efficiency potential from being realized. The main barriers discussed here include energy prices (and prices of technology), limited access to capital, lack of information, incorrect risk assessment (i.e. setting a discount rate), the principal-agent problem and transaction costs. Transaction costs are analyzed in greater detail, as they are one way or another related to all of the barriers mentioned here. Based on the analysis, there is a discussion of implications for effective policy making. These are specially needed for transaction costs, where the availability of empirical data is very limited.


Author(s):  
Thomas Bauer ◽  
Franz Wirl

AbstractLeaders are role models that affect their employees’ efforts. The effect depends on how much an employee identifies with the “boss”. Since this degree of identification is private information of the employee, additional financial incentives must be provided. Therefore, we study a principal-agent problem in which the principal affects the agent’s effort by her own effort and by financial incentives. The resulting principal-agent problem has a few non-standard specifics such as: (i) bilateral externalities as the principal’s effort affects the agent and vice versa and (ii) endogenous reservation utility of the agent. Combined, this leads to non-trivial and interesting contracts.


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