scholarly journals State capitalism and hydrocarbon security in China and Russia

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 100725
Author(s):  
Volkan Ş. Ediger ◽  
John V. Bowlus ◽  
Ahmet Faruk Dursun
Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
pp. 42-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Radygin

The paper deals with one of the characteristic trends of the 2000s, that is, the government's property expansion. It is accompanied by attempts to consolidate economic structures controlled by the state and state-owned stock packages and unitary enterprises under the aegis of holdings. Besides the government practices selective severe enforcement actions against a number of the largest private companies, strengthens its control over companies with mixed capital and establishes certain informal procedures of relationships between private business and the state. The author examines the YUKOS case and the business community's actual capacity to protect its interests. One can argue that in all likelihood the trend to the 'state capitalism' in its specific Russian variant has become clearer over 2003-2004.


2021 ◽  
pp. 102452942110032
Author(s):  
David Karas

Whereas the active role of the state in steering financialization is consensual in advanced economies, the financialization of emerging market economies is usually examined through the prism of dependency: this downplays the domestic political functions of financialization and the agency of the state. With the consolidation of state capitalist regimes in the semi-periphery after the Global Financial Crisis, different interpretations emerged – some linking state capitalism with de-financialization, others with coercive projects deepening it. Preferring a more granular and multi-dimensional approach, I analyse how different facets of financialization might represent political risks or opportunities for state capitalist projects: Based on the Hungarian example, I first explain how the constitution of a ‘financial vertical’ after 2010 inaugurated a new mode of statecraft. Second, I show how the financial vertical enabled rentier bargains between state and society after 2015 by deepening the financialization of social policy and housing in response to a looming crisis of competitiveness.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Oppenheimer
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.


1992 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
Robert L. Frost ◽  
Herrick Chapman

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