Social choice theory, belief merging, and strategy-proofness

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Chopra ◽  
Aditya Ghose ◽  
Thomas Meyer
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ismat Beg ◽  
Nabeel Butt

We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEITH DOWDING ◽  
MARTIN VAN HEES

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the ‘sincerity argument’, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the ‘transparency’ argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.


Author(s):  
Amilcar Mata Diaz ◽  
Ramon Pino Perez

With the aim of studying social properties of belief merging and having a better understanding of impossibility, we extend in three ways the framework of logic-based merging introduced by Konieczny and Pino Perez. First, at the level of representation of the information, we pass from belief bases to complex epistemic states. Second, the profiles are represented as functions of finite societies to the set of epistemic states (a sort of vectors) and not as multisets of epistemic states. Third, we extend the set of rational postulates in order to consider the epistemic versions of the classical postulates of social choice theory: standard domain, Pareto property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and absence of dictator. These epistemic versions of social postulates are given, essentially, in terms of the finite propositional logic. We state some representation theorems for these operators. These extensions and representation theorems allow us to establish an epistemic and very general version of Arrow's impossibility theorem. One of the interesting features of our result, is that it holds for different representations of epistemic states; for instance conditionals, ordinal conditional functions and, of course, total preorders.


Author(s):  
Iain McLean

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.


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