Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights

2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Francis ◽  
Katherine Schipper ◽  
Linda Vincent
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

scholarly journals Evolution of ownership and control in Italian IPO firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.

The Interdependency of Cash Flow Rights and Voting Rights on Post-acquisition Value

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 10122
Author(s):  
I-Chen Wang ◽  
Bari Bendell ◽  
Ryoichi Kubo ◽  
Ezekiel Masao Leo
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

scholarly journals The interdependency of cash flow rights and voting rights on post-acquisition value

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-187
Author(s):  
I. Kim Wang ◽  
Bari L. Bendell ◽  
Ryoichi Kubo ◽  
Ezekiel Leo
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

scholarly journals Monitoring function of the board and audit fees: contingent upon ownership concentration

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bozec ◽  
Mohamed Dia
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Group Analysis ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Panel Regressions ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

Purpose The aim of this paper is to revisit the board independence–audit fees (BI–AF) relationship while taking into account the ownership structure of the firm. Two effects are unfolding along the ownership concentration spectrum: separation of ownership and control (principal–agent problems) and separation of voting and cash flow rights (principal–principal problems). Design/methodology/approach The study is conducted over a seven-year period (2002-2008) using panel regressions on a sample of Canadian publicly traded companies. The authors use a moderated regression analysis incorporating two-way interactive terms (ownership × BI) and a sub-group analysis. Findings The results show a positive and significant relationship between BI and AF when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder. The higher the gap between voting and cash flow rights of the ultimate owner, the stronger the relationship between BI and AF. Overall, evidence supports both the demand-based perspective on AF and the expropriation effect argument. Practical implications Results support a one-size-fits-all approach to governance despite growing concerns from academics and interest groups about the appropriateness of pursuing such strategy when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder. Originality/value By taking the excess voting rights into account (difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner), the authors propose a refined classification of the sample firms along the ownership concentration spectrum.

scholarly journals Corporate ownership in Spain

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domingo Javier Santana-Martin ◽  
Inmaculada Aguiar-Diaz
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Control Threshold ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Pyramid Structures ◽  
Ultimate Owners

In this paper we analyse the structure of ownership in non-financial Spanish listed companies in the period 1996-2002, focussing on the control chain methodology. The results obtained show that the main shareholder’s control threshold stands at about 29% of the voting rights and that in 2002 families were the ultimate owners in 52.7% of the firms. On the other hand, the use of pyramid structures continues to increase. In 2002, 29.1% of the companies were controlled in this way, which means that the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for this year was 0.89

scholarly journals The effects of corporate governance on capital structure in Taiwanese corporations after controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (Special Issue 1) ◽  
pp. 35-47
Author(s):  
Lie-Huey Wang ◽  
Hsien-Chang Kuo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Seat Control ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

Since the MM theory, scholars have discussed capital structure issues from the perspectives of agency problems in corporate governance. Corporate governance has been seen as the means to reducing the agency costs produced by aligning the interests of management and shareholders, and the incentive for the management to engage in opportunistic behavior has been influenced by the firm’s ownership and board of director structures. Previous studies, however, focus on traditional financial factors and neglect the debt and equity agency problems triggered by corporate governance and their possible influences on capital structure decisions. The sample used in this study consists of 317 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2007. By controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size, our models incorporate the cash flow rights-voting rights-seat control divergence, the ownership structure, and the structure of the board of directors to examine the effects of corporate governance on the firm’s capital structure. The results show that, when the divergence between cash flow rights and seat control is lower or when the divergence between voting rights and seat control is higher, the controlling shareholders can either control the board of directors to better monitor the firm or exhibit a preference for debt financing based on entrenchment motives. Further analysis indicates that blockholders prefer lower debt financing and do not expropriate minority shareholders. Financial institutional shareholders function through their provision of monitoring and the certification of debt for technological firms and can decrease the firms’ debts. The management in the technological industry firms prefers debt financing in order to obtain agency-related benefits. While directors in traditional industries or large firms might use personal or firm debt to tunnel the firm’s assets, the function of independent directors in technological firms or large firms of lowering debts in order to reduce the firm’s bankruptcy risks is more evident.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document