Socially responsible investing through the equity funds in the global ownership network

We analyze the connectivity of equity investments to the firms in the global ownership network that are reported as non-compliant with Environment, Social, and Government (ESG) benchmarks. We find that a large number of shareholders have ownership linkages to non-ESG firms, most commonly with three or four degrees of separation. Analyzing the betweenness centrality for shareholders connecting the ultimate owners and non-ESG firms, we find that the investment management companies play important roles in channeling the investment money into non-ESG firms, where largest American asset managers commonly have one to two degrees of separation on their ownership linkages to those problematic firms. Since asset managers collect capital from investors by running the equity funds, we analyze the ownership stakes and the associated voting rights attributable to the equity funds investors. We estimate the distribution of the power of corporate control over non-ESG firms among specific asset managers (such as BlackRock and Fidelity) and among different types of the equity funds (such as mutual funds and exchanged-traded funds), and explores how investing in the equity funds rather than ownership investing may have shifted the distribution of the power to control those non-ESG firms.

Follow the money: who profits and how

This chapter turns to the bottom line of outsourced regeneration and self-regulation – the colossal financial riches made, following the money from government to the immediate companies and then through to their ultimate owners, often offshored in tax havens. A first section recaps on the variety of unnecessary costs imposed on the public sector through PFI procurement that would simply not be possible if the scheme was financed and procured directly through the public sector. A second section focuses on the complex yet lucrative financial deals done to raise the upfront investment that provide private banks, financial market traders and PFI investors with enormous, risk-free profits. A third section turns to the generous profit margins commanded by the construction and maintenance firms in these PFI schemes from the lack of genuine competition in the procurement process. A fourth section details how corporate consultants and the big four accountancy firms also financially benefit from advising and auditing on these schemes in ways that create real conflicts of interest. A final section that follows these different profitable financial flows through the MFN regeneration scheme.

PENGARUH KEPEMILIKAN DAN KEPEMIMPINAN KELUARGA SERTA EFEKTIFITAS PENGAWASAN DEKOM TERHADAP KUALITAS AUDIT

This study aims to investigate the effect of family ownership, family leadership, and the monitoring role of the Board of Commissioners on the audit quality. This study uses a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2010 to 2013. Family ownership is measured through the ultimate ownership of the company. To determine whether the company's CEO is the founder of the company, family relationship data is used on all of the company's ultimate owners. The monitoring role of the Board of Commissioners is calculated through the Asean Corporate Governance Scorecard index. Data of auditor is obtained from Center for Supervision of Financial Service (P2PK). The results showed that family ownership either through direct or indirect mechanisms tend to choose Big 4 KAP than non Big 4. While Chief Financial Officer (CFOs) from family and corporate founders tend to choose Big 4 in auditing the company. This is done to maintain the company's reputation. The results also show that the effective monitoring of the Board of Commisionners (BOC) tends to choose Big 4 auditors compared to non Big 4.

Disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies in Hong Kong

In early 2017, the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau of Hong Kong conducted a consultation and proposed to put in place a regime under its Companies Ordinance to enhance the transparency of beneficial ownership of companies by requiring them to publish the names of their ultimate owners on company registers in an effort to meet prevailing international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The consultation conclusion was published in April 2017 which stated that based on the overall support for the proposed legislation, it seeks to introduce such regime by late 2017. This article is written against such background and highlights the rationales for Hong Kong in introducing such a law. In doing so, the article will make reference to the United Kingdom and Singapore which have also recently implemented a similar regime under their company law.

PENGARUH KEPEMILIKAN ULTIMAT TERHADAP KEINFORMATIFAN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BEI

Ultimate ownership is ownership directly and indirectly in public companies to identify the ultimate owners of public Vendor. Ultimate owner has the right greater control of cash fow rights is called the controlling shareholder. This causes problems between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders, which will afect earnings informativeness. Informativeness proft is profit information that could afect stock returns. This study uses the 149 companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 2004-2009. Te data used in this study is proft and equity in the annual fnancial statements, as well as the ownership of the company. Tis test uses regression analysis moderasian with moderating variable Cash Flow Right Leverage (CFRL). CFRL is the diference between control rights to cash fow rights. The results of this study showed that the diference of control rights to cash fow rights owned by the controlling shareholders make a proft informativeness be low because shareholders can infuence policy to make accounting information, thus making proft informativeness be low.Keywords: ultimate ownership, control rights, cash fow rights, earnings informativeness.

Ultimate ownership, institutionality, and capital structure

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to illustrate and examine the effects of ultimate ownership, institutionality and their interactions on capital structure in a unified framework, based on evidence from China. Design/methodology/approach – Using six years of panel data of Chinese non-financial listed firms between 2004 and 2009, this paper estimates with correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. Findings – This paper finds that debt financing facilitates the ultimate owner's expropriation behavior. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights is positively related to capital structure, while cash flow rights negatively affect it. Compared with private ultimate owners, state ultimate owners have less incentive to reap the benefits of expropriation, implying that the separation of control rights and cash flow rights has a smaller effect on the capital structure of state-owned firms. The improvement of institutionality can restrain ultimate owners' expropriation behavior, and regional institutional development is negatively related to capital structure. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights has a smaller positive effect on capital structure in regions with better-developed institutionality. Originality/value – This paper incorporates ultimate ownership and institutionality into a unified analytical framework of capital structure. It not only enriches related studies on capital structure, but also helps us understand the institutional roots of irrational capital structure behaviors in China. This paper also provides further evidence on ultimate owners' expropriation of minority shareholders through debt financing.