Optimal monetary policy in an economy with vertical production and trade: An analysis based on the perspective of local currency pricing

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Kohjiro Dohwa
2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
pp. 2796-2822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Engel

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country world with sticky prices under pricing to market. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target consumer price inflation, the output gap, and the currency misalignment. The paper derives the loss function of a cooperative monetary policymaker and the optimal targeting rules. The model is a modified version of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (JME, 2002). The key change is that we allow pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of currency misalignments. JEL: E52, F31, F41


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralf Fendel ◽  
Christoph Swonke ◽  
Michael Frenkel

Abstract In new open-economy macroeconomic models, the assumption on the pricing behavior of firms in international trade plays a central role. Whether firms apply producer currency pricing (PCP) or local currency pricing (LCP) crucially affects, for example, the design of optimal monetary policy or the choice of the optimal exchange rate system. However, empirical evidence has so far been mixed and is furthermore mostly of an indirect nature. This paper draws direct evidence on the price-setting behavior of German exporters from a questionnaire-based survey. We find that PCP applies in more integrated markets. Differences between LCP firms and PCP firms mainly exist with respect to the use of mark-ups and in the validity of the law of one price for their respective products.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liutang Gong ◽  
Chan Wang ◽  
Heng-Fu Zou

Abstract This paper examines optimal monetary policy rules in a model of vertical production and trade with reference currency. As evidenced by empirical findings, we assume that final-goods prices are sticky, but intermediate-goods prices are flexible. We find that even if intermediate-goods prices are flexible, monetary authorities need to respond to the shocks at the stage of intermediate-goods production. We also find that, when a shock occurs at the stage of final-goods production, monetary responses are independent of the expenditure share of final-goods producers on intermediate goods. For the first time in the literature, our model gives a condition under which both countries are willing to participate in monetary cooperation. Thus the gains from cooperation are real. In addition, we compare the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in Nash case with that in cooperative case, and compare the volatility of the nominal exchange rate in our model with that in a model without vertical production and trade as well. We also extend the model to consider a case of dual price stickiness. We find that the change in solution methods completely alters the conclusions of the model.


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