A cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions

2016 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 43-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Huang ◽  
Ping He ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Cooperative Differential Game

A TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION FORMULA FOR BARGAINING PROBLEM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (04) ◽  
pp. 1450016 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEON A. PETROSYAN ◽  
DAVID W. K. YEUNG
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Payoff Distribution ◽  
Consistent Solution ◽  
Cooperative Differential Game

This paper presents a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a bargaining problem in cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. In particular, individual rationality is satisfied for every player throughout the cooperation period.

A non-cooperative differential game-based security model in fog computing

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Li ◽  
Xianwei Zhou ◽  
Yanzhu Liu ◽  
Haitao Xu ◽  
Li Miao
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Fog Computing ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Cooperative Differential Game

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Chuansheng Wang ◽  
Fulei Shi ◽  
Cuiyou Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Feedback Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Positive Part ◽  
The Public ◽  
Pollution Management ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
The Government

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase

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