Analysing a closed-loop supply chain with selling price, warranty period and green sensitive consumer demand under revenue sharing contract

2018 ◽  
Vol 190 ◽  
pp. 822-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
B.C. Giri ◽  
C. Mondal ◽  
T. Maiti
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Consumer Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

scholarly journals Reverse Revenue Sharing Contract versus Two-Part Tariff Contract under a Closed-Loop Supply Chain System

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zunya Shi ◽  
Nengmin Wang ◽  
Tao Jia ◽  
Haoxun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Closed Loop System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Economic Improvement

The importance of remanufacturing has been recognized in research and practice. The integrated system, combining the forward and reverse activities of supply chains, is called closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system. By coordination in the CLSC system, players will get economic improvement. This paper studies different coordination performances of two types of contracts, two-part tariff (TTC) and reverse revenue sharing contract (RRSC), in a closed-loop system. Through mathematical analysis based on Stackelberg Game Theory, we find that it is easy for manufacturer to improve more profits and retailer’s collection effects by adjusting the ratio of transfer collection price through RRSC, and we also give the function to calculate the best ratio of transfer collection price, which may be a valuable reference for the decision maker in practice. Besides, our results also suggest that although the profits of the coordinated CLSC system are always higher than the contradictory scenario, the RRSC is more favorable to the manufacturer than to the retailer, as results show that the manufacturer will share more profits from the system through RRSC. Therefore, RRSC has attracted the manufacturers more to closing the supply chain for economic consideration.

scholarly journals A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Peng Yang ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.

scholarly journals Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Capacity Constraint ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate

This paper explores the decision-making and coordination mechanism of pricing and collection rate in a closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraint in recycling channels, which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. On the basis of game theory, the equilibriums of decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios are obtained and compared. Through the performance analysis of a different scenario, a higher saving production cost and lower competition intensity trigger the members to engage in remanufacturing. Furthermore, we try to propose a two-part tariff contract through bargaining to coordinate supply chain and achieve a Pareto improvement. The results show that when the capacity constraints in recycling channels exceed a threshold, the decisions and profit will change. Additionally, for closed-loop supply chain, the selling price is more susceptible to the influence of capacity constraint in recycling channel than the members’ profit.

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