scholarly journals Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Capacity Constraint ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate

This paper explores the decision-making and coordination mechanism of pricing and collection rate in a closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraint in recycling channels, which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. On the basis of game theory, the equilibriums of decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios are obtained and compared. Through the performance analysis of a different scenario, a higher saving production cost and lower competition intensity trigger the members to engage in remanufacturing. Furthermore, we try to propose a two-part tariff contract through bargaining to coordinate supply chain and achieve a Pareto improvement. The results show that when the capacity constraints in recycling channels exceed a threshold, the decisions and profit will change. Additionally, for closed-loop supply chain, the selling price is more susceptible to the influence of capacity constraint in recycling channel than the members’ profit.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination under a Reward–Penalty and a Manufacturer’s Subsidy Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9329
Author(s):  
Sungki Kim ◽  
Nina Shin ◽  
Sangwook Park
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Recyclable Resources

Government legislation significantly impacts closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operations. This study examines the collection rate of and decisions on the product greening improvement level in a three-level CLSC with the government’s reward–penalty and a manufacturer’s subsidy policy. Four game-theoretic models are analyzed in order to evaluate the ways in which the policy and revenue-sharing contracts (RSCs) between the manufacturer and retailer affect the CLSC members’ optimal decisions and profits. We found that a reward–penalty and subsidy policy raise the collection rate, as well as the product greening improvement level. A manufacturer’s financial conflict of interest can be mitigated using RSCs. The RSCs between the manufacturer and the retailer also increase the profit of a recycling company that successfully coordinates the CLSC. An interesting result is that, when the RSCs are used under the subsidy policy, the collection rate is higher than it is in a centralized model. We also found that the subsidy level needs to be adjusted according to the price of the recycling resources, and that increasing the value of the recyclable resources and lowering the recycling costs in the early stages of the supply chain collaboration could lead to higher environmental sustainability. These results illustrate that using an RSC can effectively coordinate the CLSC, and can thus help policy implementation by governments.

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

Research on Coordination in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.

scholarly journals Three-Echelon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6472
Author(s):  
Guitao Zhang ◽  
Xiao Zhang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Xinyu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Utilization Rate ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
High Emission ◽  
The Government

This paper investigates the impacts of cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation on a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain network (CLSCN) that consists of suppliers, high-emission and low-emission manufacturers, demand markets and carbon trading centers. The presented CLSCN model includes both product trading and carbon trading subnets. Combining variational inequality theory (VI) with complementary theory, we first characterize the optimal conditions for members in each tier first, and then derive that of the entire CLSCN. In addition, we focus on the effects of carbon caps and EOL collection rate target on CLSCN performances with numerical examples. The results reveal that, in some cases, there is a consistency between carbon emission reduction target of the government and the profit target of enterprises. The government should choose reasonable and moderate carbon caps for all the enterprises to balance the CLSCN members’ economic interests, carbon emissions, as well as resources utilization rate. Moreover, the government should not blindly pursue a high collection rate target. The above conclusions can provide practical guidance for governments and enterprises in a CLSCN under CAT regulation.

scholarly journals Production Decision and Coordination Mechanism of Socially Responsible Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Long ◽  
Jiali Ge ◽  
Tong Shu ◽  
Chunxia Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has a significant impact on the operation of enterprises. This study analyzes the production and coordination decisions of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) by establishing two assumptions of endogenous and exogenous CSR. The results reveal that, for ordinary consumers, CSR is quantified as the parameter of consumer surplus, which has an impact on the patent licensing fee, revenue-sharing ratio, and so on, and which not only increases the sales quantity in CLSC but also creates more value for the manufacturer and the retailer. Considering endogenous CSR, the study found that the manufacturer’s CSR level and the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits both increase with the proportion of CSR-sensitive consumers. In the endogenous model, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price and lower patent licensing fee than in the exogenous model. Perfect coordination in the two models can be achieved by setting a revenue-sharing ratio related to wholesale price and patent licensing fee. In practice, improving the social responsibility consciousness of consumers and raising enterprises’ CSR level can achieve a win-win situation for revenues and social welfare.

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