scholarly journals Reverse Revenue Sharing Contract versus Two-Part Tariff Contract under a Closed-Loop Supply Chain System

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zunya Shi ◽  
Nengmin Wang ◽  
Tao Jia ◽  
Haoxun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Closed Loop System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Economic Improvement

The importance of remanufacturing has been recognized in research and practice. The integrated system, combining the forward and reverse activities of supply chains, is called closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system. By coordination in the CLSC system, players will get economic improvement. This paper studies different coordination performances of two types of contracts, two-part tariff (TTC) and reverse revenue sharing contract (RRSC), in a closed-loop system. Through mathematical analysis based on Stackelberg Game Theory, we find that it is easy for manufacturer to improve more profits and retailer’s collection effects by adjusting the ratio of transfer collection price through RRSC, and we also give the function to calculate the best ratio of transfer collection price, which may be a valuable reference for the decision maker in practice. Besides, our results also suggest that although the profits of the coordinated CLSC system are always higher than the contradictory scenario, the RRSC is more favorable to the manufacturer than to the retailer, as results show that the manufacturer will share more profits from the system through RRSC. Therefore, RRSC has attracted the manufacturers more to closing the supply chain for economic consideration.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8602
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

scholarly journals A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Peng Yang ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.

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